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1 Introduction 
The reaction to unfair trading practices (UTPs) in agri-food supply chains has become a 
key feature of agricultural policies at state, regional and global levels. It is part of a more 
general phenomenon concerning the governance of global chains1. The increased level of 
global trade in agriculture has called for new approaches to tackle unfair practices 
beyond states’ boundaries. Increasingly, bargaining power is unevenly distributed along 
global supply chains. There has been a growing concentration at the retailer and 
processor levels while producers remain relatively small and fragmented2. The 
distribution of value along agri-food supply chains has changed in recent years3. Low 
prices at production level make farmers more vulnerable to UTPs4. Costs generated by 
regulation have been shifted. Regulatory burdens, imposed by countries of the product’s 
final destination, are often borne by suppliers and farmers. In such an environment the 
likelihood of UTPs in global supply chains increases; the lack of adequate institutional 
responses does not allow the significant market failures related to UTPs to be addressed. 
UTPs hinder trade in agricultural commodities, negatively affect competition and burden 
producers with additional risks and costs that may undermine the objectives of the 
European common agricultural policy (CAP). UTPs can condition access to the supply 
chain and determine exit from the chain, reducing farmers’ market opportunities to grow 
or even to survive5. 
The EU has long engaged in a policy aimed at strengthening farmers’ position in supply 
chains. Combating UTPs is part of this policy. The EU approach has been incremental, 
moving from soft law and private regulation to harder instruments; in the food sector 
particularly, the desirability of legislation has been considered several times over the last 
five to ten years. In July 2014, the Commission adopted a Communication on tackling 
                                           
1 See A. Renda, F. Cafaggi and J. Pelkmans, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business 
Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain, Final Report, 26 February 2014, Prepared for the European 
Commission, DG Internal Market (DG MARKT/2012/049/E), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/retail/docs/140711-study-utp-legal-framework_en.pdf. 
2 See OECD, 15 May 2014, Competition issues in the food chain industry. 
3 This distribution can be evaluated by comparing commodity prices at production and consumption levels.  
4 See European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-
to-business food supply chain, Strasbourg, 15.7.2014, COM 2016 (472) final: ‘While UTPs are not the 
cause of the recent price declines, the low prices have made farmers more vulnerable to potential unfair 
behaviour by their trading partners.’ 
5 See J. Lee, G. Gereffi and J. Beauvais, Global value chains and agrifood standards: challenges and possibilities 
for smallholders in developing countries, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 109(31): 12326-
12331, 2012; OECD, 15 May 2014, Competition issues in the food chain industry; P. Verbruggen and T. 
Havinga (eds.), Hybridization of Food Governance: Trends, Types and Results, Elgar, Cheltenham, UK – 
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UTPs in the business-to-business (B2B) food supply chain6. Meanwhile, Member States 
(MSs) have adopted different measures, often combining legislation and forms of steered 
private regulation. 
Legislation exists at MS level but regulatory approaches diverge in terms of both 
instruments and practices7. So far, 24 MSs have legislated on UTPs, and 12 specifically in 
food chains8. In some MSs, legislation is principle-based, with general clauses that 
prohibit unfair practices, leaving the enforcers with the task of determining specific 
prohibited practices. In other MSs, legislation is very detailed, and deploys blacklists to 
exemplify prohibited practices9. Many legislations combine general clauses with lists of 
practices. In these cases, enforcers have less discretion but the risk of under-deterrence 
is higher when new unfair practices emerge. Principle-based legislation, in contrast, 
leaves more discretion to enforcers but it can address new forms of UTPs as they arise. 
Differences also concern the instruments. A few countries have simply extended 
consumer protection legislation to farmers and producers. The majority have opted to 
take a different route, enacting specific B2B legislation motivated by the different types 
of practices and the need for specific supply-chain remedies. The private regulation 
regime, introduced with the Principles of good practice, also reflects a combination of 
general principles and a list of unfair practices paired with good practices10.  
There is no full consensus over the definition of UTPs or how different trade practices are 
recognised as unfair (see below, section 3.2). There is also no agreement over the 
instruments additional to competition law, law whose effectiveness was questioned by a 
European Competition Network (ECN) study in 201211. MSs diverge not only on the 
relative weight of competition law versus contractual or extra-contractual liability to 
counteract UTPs but, even for violations that are addressed with the same instrument 
(contract, unfair competition), sanctions and remedies may differ (see below for in-depth 
analysis). As will be shown, both the level of penalties and the scope of imposed 
injunctions vary between administrative enforcement systems. These differences, and 
the ensuing fragmentation, has stimulated the debate over the desirability of EU 
intervention in order to have minimum common standards to tackle UTPs in the agri-food 
sector.  
The European Commission had first promoted a self-regulatory regime that was 
consistent with the inter-professional approach that characterises European agriculture. A 
set of principles was developed by a range of stakeholders in the agri-food chain in 2011. 
This was followed by an initiative for implementation and enforcement in 2013. The food 
supply chain initiative (FSCI or SCI) arose out of a proposal by the Commission’s High 
                                           
6 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-
business food supply chain, Strasbourg, 15.7.2014, COM(2014) 472 final. 
7 See A. Renda, F. Cafaggi and J. Pelkmans, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business 
Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain, February 2014; Johan Swinnen and Senne Vandevelde, 
‘Regulating UTPs: diversity versus harmonisation of Member State rules’, in Federica Di Marcantonio and 
Pavel Ciaian (eds.), Unfair Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain: A Literature Review on 
Methodologies, Impacts and Regulatory Aspects, JRC technical report, 2017, pp. 39-59, available at 
http://www.centromarca.pt/folder/conteudo/1772_7_JRC_report_utps_final.pdf (hereinafter A literature 
review), pp. 41 ff.  
8 Among MSs having some type of UTP legislation we also include four MSs (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden) whose legislation is merely focused on some pre-contractual practices, mainly tailored around the 
concept of misleading and aggressive practices inherited from consumer law and based on Directive 
2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market (hereinafter Directive 2005/29/EC). A part of the in-
depth analysis below will focus on only the remaining 20 MSs’ legislation. Grounds for this decision are 
explained below (see section 3). 
9 See European Commission Communication, Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food 
supply chain, COM 2016 (472) final, pp. 5-6.  
10 See B2B Platform of the High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain, Vertical Relationships 
in Food Supply Chain: Principles of Good Practice, 29.11.2011, available at 
http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/about-initiative/principles-good-practice-vertical-relationships-food-
supply-chain (hereinafter Principles of Good Practice). 
11 See ECN, ECN Activities in the Food Sector, Report on competition law enforcement and market monitoring 
activities by European competition authorities in the food sector, May 2012. 
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Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain12. It represents a form of 
‘governed self-regulation’, with the European Commission playing an important role as a 
facilitator. One of the problems in the FSCI is the absence of farmers’ associations, which 
decided to pull out of the initiative right after its creation. The FSCI monitors and 
enforces the principles of the code of practice13. The results of this approach are unclear; 
whether self-regulation delivers the expected results with a significant reduction of the 
number and intensity of unfair practices is debated14. It appears that it can properly work 
as a complement to legislation in terms of both regulatory and enforcement practices. 
In January 2016, the Commission published a report on unfair trade practices in the food 
supply chain15. The report focused on the MSs’ regulatory frameworks and the impact of 
the FSCI16. It concluded that, ‘given the positive developments in parts of the food chain 
and since different approaches could address UTPs effectively, the Commission does not 
see the added value of a specific harmonised regulatory approach at EU level at this 
stage. However, the Commission recognises that, since in many Member States 
legislation was introduced only very recently, results must be closely monitored, and 
reassessed, if necessary’17. 
Soon thereafter, in June 2016, the European Parliament issued a resolution encouraging 
the Commission to act18. The European Parliament underlined the fragmentation and 
divergences across MSs19. There was subsequently a report by the Agricultural Markets 
Task Force (AMTF) with recommendations on various issues, including UTPs20. Very 
recently (2017), the Commission published an inception impact assessment for 
consultation that defined different regulatory options21. The two main variables in the 
inception impact assessment concern the nature of the instruments and their coverage. 
Regarding the instruments, the alternatives proposed were non-binding instruments, 
such as guidelines or recommendations (option 2) or framework legislation (options 3 
and 4). As to the coverage, the choice is between (1) an instrument to protect weaker 
parties and (2) an instrument regulating the relationships within the whole food chain. 
The results of the consultation suggest that the opportunity for a legislative intervention 
should be reconsidered. 
                                           
12  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
A better functioning food supply chain in Europe, Brussels, 28.10.2009, COM(2009) 591. 
13 See Principles of Good Practice. 
14 See Agricultural Markets Task Force, Improving Market Outcomes. Enhancing the Position of Farmers in the 
Supply Chain, Report of the Agricultural Markets Task Force, Brussels, November 2016, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/agri-markets-task-. 
15 See European Commission Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on unfair 
business-to-business trading practices in the food supply chain, January 2016. 
16 See European Commission (2016): ‘This report concentrates on the existing frameworks for tackling UTPs. It 
has two main elements: (1) an assessment of the existing regulatory and enforcement frameworks in the 
Member States; and (2) an assessment of the impact of the voluntary EU-wide Supply Chain Initiative 
(SCI) and the national SCI platforms that have been set up.’ 
17 For an analysis concerning the existence of national legislation addressing UTPs in supply chains, see section 
3.  
18 See European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2016 on unfair trading practices in the food supply chain 
(2015/2065(INI)). 
19 See European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2016: ‘41. Notes that, in adopting measures to counter UTPs 
within the food supply chain, due account must be taken of the specific features of each market and the 
legal requirements that apply to it, the different situations and approaches in individual Member States, 
the degree of consolidation or fragmentation of individual markets, and other significant factors, while also 
capitalising on measures already taken in some Member States that are proving to be effective; takes the 
view that any proposed regulatory efforts in this area should ensure that there is relatively broad 
discretion to tailor the measures to be taken to the specific features of each market, in order to avoid 
adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, and should be based on the general principle of improving 
enforcement by involving the relevant public bodies alongside the concept of private enforcement, thus 
also contributing to improving the fragmented and low level of cooperation that exists within different 
national enforcement bodies and to addressing cross-border challenges regarding UTPs; 42. Points out 
that the existing fragmented and low level of cooperation within different national enforcement bodies is 
not sufficient to address cross-border challenges regarding UTPs’ (emphasis added). 
20 See the Report of the Agricultural Markets Task Force, Brussels, November 2016. 
21 See Inception Impact Assessment, Initiative to Improve the Food Supply Chain, 25 July 2017. 
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2 A supply chain approach to UTPs regulation 
Unfair trade practices in supply chains are quite common in the agri-food sector. In the 
field of agriculture, the definition provided by the EU Commission in its 2014 
Communication represents a useful starting point: ‘UTPs can broadly be defined as 
practices that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, are contrary to good faith 
and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on another’22. UTPs 
may result in civil, administrative and at times criminal infringements. As we shall see, 
these three dimensions often co-exist and the three enforcement regimes can be in place 
in relation to the same UTP.  
In its 2016 Report, the Commission paid special attention to the supply chain dimension: 
‘Looking ahead, given that UTPs can potentially occur at every stage of the chain, 
Member States that have not yet done so should consider introducing legislation 
that covers the entire B2B food supply chain. This is important in order to ensure 
that all smaller market operators have adequate protection from UTPs, as many small 
market operators do not deal directly with retailers. Member States should also ensure 
that their legislation covers operators from non-EU countries (for example, primary 
producers from Africa or Latin America)’ ‘(emphasis added). 
The supply chain approach also characterises private regulation. The FSCI defines 
principles and rules to be applied all along the chain. The regulatory perspective 
combines general principles related to risk allocation along the chain with specific rules 
prohibiting contractual clauses that distribute risks (and costs) unfairly23. The principle of 
proportionality indirectly emerges from the description of the unfair practice, where a 
disproportionate risk is imposed on producers24.  
Who are the infringers in supply chains? UTPs within a supply chain may be decided by 
the chain leader and applied all along the chain. Depending on the decision-making 
power held by each party within the chain, the participants in the chain may either be co-
infringers or mere ‘agents’ of the chain leader’s illegal behaviour. These different 
positions may have an effect on their liability, on sanctions and on civil remedies. When 
infringers are located in different MSs or where some are in MSs and some are located 
outside the EU, the definition of laws applicable to the same infringement committed by 
multiple infringers can become highly complex.  
Taking a supply chain approach to legal regulation has important implications. UTPs have 
both efficiency effects and distributional effects concerning costs and risks. They 
redistribute value along the chain, frequently penalising producers and the upstream part 
of the chain while benefiting large buyers in the downstream part. Unfair distribution of 
both risks and costs often occurs through contractual provisions reproduced along the 
chain that may qualify as UTPs. Contract clauses may permit unilateral changes, raising 
costs and increasing requirements that producers have to meet without a corresponding 
increase in prices. These contractual clauses may be voided and their effects removed. 
While it is claimed that UTPs occur throughout the chain, the most significant ones 
happen in the upper part of the chain.  
Different policy options might be taken to correct unfair distribution. A first option 
regulates UTPs along the chain regardless of the potentially injured party’s economic 
function; a second option instead focuses on UTPs specifically against producers. Some 
                                           
22 See European Commission Communication, Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food 
supply chain, COM 2016 (472) final. 
23 According to the code of practice general principle ‘RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK: All contracting parties in the 
supply chain should bear their own appropriate entrepreneurial risks’. From the general principle the good 
practice is distilled ‘Different operators face specific risks at each stage of the supply chain – linked to the 
potential rewards for conducting business in that field. All operators take responsibility for their own risks 
and do not unduly attempt to transfer their risks to other parties’. See Principles of Good Practice. 
24 In relation to entrepreneurial risk allocation the code states: ‘Transfer of unjustified or disproportionate risk 
to a contracting party, for example imposing a guarantee of margin via payment for no performance’.  
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recent legislation at MS level applies to the entire chain25. Others apply only to the 
relationship between retailers and their direct suppliers. 
Conceptually different approaches might be used. The most radical approach provides a 
legal definition of a supply chain and applies to all the relationships within the chain26. 
The least radical approach focuses on bilateral relationships between producers and 
buyers, but considers the effects of the UTP along the chain27. An intermediate approach 
focuses on bilateral relationships but considers the harmful consequences for the entire 
chain. The intermediate approach seems to be the most popular in recent legislation. 
Within the bilateral approach there are differences between legislation that applies only 
to producers of agricultural commodities and legislation (as in Ireland) that applies only 
to a specific contractual relationship between retailers or wholesalers and suppliers (see, 
more extensively, below, section 3.1).  
According to the supply chain approach, if the large buyer exercises the UTP in 
agreement with first-tier suppliers, the impact of the unfair practice on the second- and 
third-tier suppliers would need to be considered. For example, retroactive conditions 
after the contracts are concluded, delay of payments and/or wrongful contractual 
terminations may have created cascade effects on the upstream part of the chain even if 
they do not directly apply to them. These effects have to be considered when 
imposing punishment for the infringement and providing remedies for those 
harmed by the UTP.  
The supply chain approach has been prominent in some MSs within the EU28. For 
example, in 2013 Spain subscribed to a supply chain approach that regulated UTPs along 
the chain29. Moving from this perspective, Spanish legislation takes into due 
consideration situations in which an SME is in a relationship with a buyer that is 
characterised by economic dependence or at least one of the two conditions occurs 
(nature of SME or economic dependence). According to the Spanish legislation, economic 
dependence exists when the supplier sells at least 30% of its overall production to a 
single buyer30. The European Commission encourages MSs that are going to introduce 
new legislation to adopt a supply chain approach31.  
The supply chain approach to UTPs is not necessarily associated with trans-border 
infringements. It can apply to both domestic and trans-border chains. Legal aspects 
                                           
25 For example, in Spain and Italy. The scope of some legislation instead is more restricted and excludes 
cooperatives. See section 3.1. 
26 See F. Cafaggi, Regulation through contracts: supply-chain contracting and sustainability standards, 
European Review of Contract Law, 2016, pp. 218-258. 
27 These two approaches are captured by options 3 and 4 of the European Commission’s Inception Impact 
Assessment, 2017. 
28 According to the European Commission ‘The laws in the majority of the Member States apply to business–to-
business (B2B) relationships in all stages of the supply chain. Some Member States apply legislation only to 
relationships in which one party is a retailer’. See European Commission Report 2016. p. 4. 
29 See in Spain, Article 3, Law 12/2013, of 2 August 2013, measures to improve the functioning of the food 
supply chain: ‘This Act aims to: ... Improve the functioning and structuring of the food supply chain to the 
benefit of both consumers and operators, while ensuring a sustainable distribution of value added across 
the sectors comprising it.’ See also Article 5. Definitions: ‘For the purposes of this Act, the following 
definitions shall apply: Food supply chain: The set of activities carried out by the various operators involved 
in the production, processing and distribution of food or food products, excluding transportation, hotel and 
restaurant activities’. 
30 See Article 2(3), Law 12/2013: ‘The scope of Title II, Chapter I of this law [on legal form and minimum 
content of agri-food contracts] is limited to the commercial relations of operators engaging in commercial 
transactions the value of which exceeds €2 500, provided that said operators find themselves in any of the 
following situations of imbalance: operators find themselves in any of the following situations of imbalance: 
a) One of the operators is an SME and the other is not. b) In the case of the marketing of unprocessed 
agricultural products, perishable goods and food inputs, one of the operators has primary agricultural, 
livestock, fishery or forestry producer status, or is a group having such status, and the other does not. c) 
One of the operators is economically dependent on the other operator, meaning that the total sum for 
which the former invoiced the latter accounts for at least 30% of the former's turnover during the previous 
year’.  
31 See European Commission Report 2016. p. 5. ‘Looking ahead, given that UTPs can potentially occur at every 
stage of the chain, Member States that have not yet done so should consider introducing legislation that 
covers the entire B2B food supply chain.’  
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concerning trans-border infringements require decisions about applicable laws and 
criteria to identify the competent enforcer(s). A supply chain approach in trans-border 
infringements should definitely distinguish between EU infringements and those that 
affect enterprises and farmers operating beyond the EU territory. Even though there is no 
dedicated research comparing UTPs within and outside the EU, it is likely that both the 
nature and the enforcement may vary depending on whether they are addressed to EU or 
non-EU producers. 
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3 The current legal framework at national level 
3.1 National legislation addressing UTPs in supply chains 
Although most MSs have adopted some legislation in the area of unfair trade practices in 
B2B relations, the legal landscape is rather diverse across the EU.  
Among those which have introduced new rules:  
— some have opted for legislation;  
— some have opted for a pure self-regulatory option (e.g. Belgium, Estonia, the 
Netherlands); 
— many have chosen a hybrid approach that combines legislation and self-regulation.  
The hybrid approach has taken different forms: in some cases (Spain, Portugal, 
Slovakia), there is a double track system which includes both legislation and codes, with 
the latter playing a complementary role that is explicitly acknowledged in legislation; in 
other cases, the code definition of UTPs has been incorporated by reference in legislation 
(Italy); in others, the hybridity results in private rule-making and public enforcement (UK 
Grocery Code and Adjudicator).  
This section is focused on legislation. Private regulation, including the EU platform 
established with the FSCI, will not be specifically addressed, although it will be 
occasionally referred to.  
Within the context of legislative instruments, the present analysis will not consider 
legislation exclusively based on competition law and tailored upon Article 102 of 
the of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), even when the 
concept of dominant position and the relevant market thresholds have been stretched 
beyond the EU definition (e.g. as is the case for Finland). As acknowledged in previous 
reports and studies, a legislative approach exclusively based on competition law may fail 
to capture most relevant UTPs in national and global supply chains32. By contrast, the 
present analysis will consider legislation that, although introduced within a competition 
law framework, does not require a specific UTP’s impact on market competition: this may 
be the case when national competition law expands beyond the boundaries of Article 102 
TFEU, sometimes through the concepts of abuse of bargaining superior power or abuse of 
economic dependence (e.g. in Germany).  
Other ‘borderline’ approaches are taken by those MSs that have addressed only a very 
limited range of unfair practices in the area of pre-contractual information, 
advertising and unsolicited offers, mostly as a spill-over effect of consumer law in the 
field of unfair commercial practices, although not necessarily through explicit extension of 
business-to-consumer (B2C) legislation to the B2B domain. This is the case for Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Among these, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have 
extended, at least in part, legislation implementing the consumer directive on UTPs 
(Directive 2005/29/EC) to B2B relationships. In Sweden, such extension has explicitly 
included Annex I of the Directive, listing the per se prohibited practices. In Belgium, 
Articles VI.104-109 of the Code de droit économique (Book VI, Title 4, Chapter 2) 
specifically address unfair market practices towards persons different from consumers 
and provide for a general prohibition of business acts infringing honest market practices 
and harming other businesses; however, the type of practices addressed remains within 
the limited range described above with regard to pre-contractual information, advertising 
and unsolicited offers. A fifth MS, namely Austria, has taken a similar approach by 
extending the consumer unfair practice legislation to B2B relations, including the list of 
                                           
32 A. Renda, F. Cafaggi, J. Pelkmans, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business Unfair 
Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain, February 2014. See also ECN, Report on competition law 
enforcement and market monitoring activities by European competition authorities in the food sector, May 
2012, p. 11. 
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per se unfair practices33. It departs from the approach taken in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden for two reasons: (i) because it makes unfair practices in B2B relations subject to 
civil remedies (namely injunctions and damages) only to the extent that they materially 
distort competition; (ii) because Austria also addresses UTPs in another piece of 
legislation (the Local Supply Act), examined below. 
As a result of its limited scope, MSs legislation that is exclusively focused on pre-
contractual information, advertising and unsolicited offers will not be examined within the 
variety of legislative instruments specifically addressing unfair trade practices in B2B 
relations34. Nor will advertising legislation (including implementation of Directive 
2006/114/EC of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising 
be specifically considered in the present analysis. Indeed, as shown below, policy debate 
on B2B UTPs in global supply chains focuses on practices different from those addressed 
by this type of legislation.  
Last but not least, in order to maintain a sufficient degree of specificity and 
comparability, the present analysis will not specifically examine the role played in 
MSs by general contract law and general tort law, although acknowledging that this 
role may be very important, especially when no specific legislative instrument is adopted.   
Within the boundaries just defined, the analysis leads to the observations that: 
— 4 MSs (Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands) do not have any specific 
legislative instrument to address UTPs in B2B relations; 
— 4 MSs (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, as just described) address a very limited 
range of practices mainly focused on pre-contractual information, advertising and 
offer design;  
— 20 MSs have some type of legislation specifically addressing unfair trade practices in 
B2B relations.  
                                           
33 See also the German Unfair Competition Act addressing misleading and aggressive practices in the contexts 
of both B2C and B2B relations; the list of per se unfair practices is applicable only to consumers, however. 
See Act against Unfair Competition in the version published on 3 March 2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 
254), as last amended by Article 4 of the Act of 17 February 2016 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 233). 
34 See EU Commission Communication, Tackling unfair trading practices, p. 3, acknowledging that practices 
addressed by 2005/29/EC Directive are rather different from the ones discussed as UTP in B2B chains. 
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Table 1. MSs by UTPs legislation 
No legislation on UTPs Limited scope legislation 
(mainly consumer-type 
UTP approach) 
Specific legislation on 
UTPs 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Croatia 
Italy 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Hungary 
Austria 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
United Kingdom 
For the reasons above explained, the analysis below will focus on the legislation in the 20 
MSs mentioned in the third column of Table 1.  
Different approaches may be distinguished. In some cases (e.g. in Germany and Cyprus), 
UTPs have been addressed by stretching the scope of competition law beyond the 
boundaries of Article 102 TFEU, and applying the concept of abuse to economic 
dependence or superior bargaining power. This approach has been taken by other MSs, 
such as Bulgaria, where more focused and sector-specific legislation has also been 
adopted, namely in the food sector. In other cases (representing the vast majority of 
MSs that have legislative instruments on UTPs), dedicated legislation has been adopted 
outside the scope of national competition law. This legislation tends to focus on 
contractual relations between suppliers and processors or retailers, and covers the 
several stages of such relations: from pre-contractual, to contract negotiation and 
drafting, execution and termination, therefore going well beyond the scope of legislation 
tailored on the consumer protection approach taken in some other MSs (as in Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden; see above, in this section)35. 
Among the 20 MSs mentioned, 12 have adopted legislative instruments specifically 
applicable to the food supply chain, whereas in 8 MSs the UTP legislation is applicable 
to all sectors, although sometimes including specific provisions on practices in food and 
groceries trade (e.g. in France, Latvia and Portugal; in Latvia and in Portugal a specific 
list of prohibited UTPs has been provided for the food sector). Table 2 shows these 
distinctions.  
  
                                           
35 In these countries, the application of consumer legislation to B2toB relationships may not allow the 
consideration of some of the practices concerning contractual activities. See Directive 2005/29/EC, which 
applies without prejudice to contract law (Article 3(2)).  
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Table 2. Cross-sector or agri-food sector-specific legislation on UTPs 
Cross-sector legislation on UTPs Specific legislation on UTPs in the agri-
food sector 
Germany 
Greece 
France 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Austria 
Portugal 
 
 
 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Ireland 
Spain 
Croatia 
Italy 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
United Kingdom36 
Other variables concern the addressed segment of supply chains. As shown in table 
3, in five MSs (Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, Hungary, United Kingdom), examined 
legislation is applicable only to retailers; this is mostly the case for MSs that have 
adopted specific legislation in the food sector, although in one case (Lithuania) retailers’ 
practices are addressed regardless of the economic sector.  
Table 3. Cross-sector or agri-food sector-specific legislation on UTPs along the chain or applicable 
to retailers only 
 Cross-sector legislation on 
UTPs 
Specific legislation on 
UTPs in the agri-food 
sector 
LEGISLATION APPLICABLE 
ALONG THE WHOLE CHAIN 
Germany 
France 
Greece 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Austria 
Portugal 
 
 
Bulgaria 
Spain 
Croatia 
Italy 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO 
RETAILERS ONLY 
Lithuania 
 
Czech Republic 
Ireland 
Hungary 
United Kingdom 
 
 
In all the other cases, legislation is applicable at all stages along the chain. It is 
remarkable that, even within this set of legislative instruments, variations emerge 
depending on the supply chain structure. For example, the Croatian Act on the 
prohibition of unfair trading practices in the B2B food supply chain provides both general 
and specific lists of prohibited UTPs based on the type of relationship (between the 
                                           
36 More precisely, the UK Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market Investigation Order 2009 refers to groceries 
going beyond the food sector as strictly intended: ‘Groceries means food (other than that sold for 
consumption in the store), pet food, drinks (alcoholic and non-alcoholic, other than that sold for 
consumption in the store), cleaning products, toiletries and household goods, but excludes petrol, clothing, 
DIY products, financial services, pharmaceuticals, newspapers, magazines, greetings cards, CDs, DVDs, 
videos and audio tapes, toys, plants, flowers, perfumes, cosmetics, electrical appliances, kitchen hardware, 
gardening equipment, books, tobacco and tobacco products, and Grocery shall be construed accordingly’ (§ 
2(1)). 
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supplier and the buyer or processor, and between the supplier and the re-seller). In 
comparison, the French Commercial Code includes both general scope provisions (e.g. 
Article 442-6) and specific provisions on distribution contractual relations, therefore 
concerning the last segment of the chain only (e.g. Article 441-7). 
The supply chain structure also comes into consideration when transactions are dealt 
with within cooperative companies, which allow the setting of different contract terms, 
more stable relationships and different modes of monitoring over trade compliance. As a 
consequence, some legislation excludes these transactions from the scope of application 
of laws on unfair trade practices; this is, for example, the case in Spain and Poland. 
A third type of variable is the size of business. Indeed, the size of potential infringers is 
sometimes considered a proxy for bargaining power, and the size of potential injured 
party is considered a further proxy for an unbalanced relationship. As a consequence, 
some MSs have limited the scope of legislation:  
(i) to businesses exceeding a certain size or  
(ii) to relationships in which only one party is a small or micro-enterprise.     
The approach under (i), restricting the scope of application of UTP legislation to ‘large 
enterprises’ only, is, for example, taken in:  
— Croatia, whose legislation applies to resellers whose turnover in Croatia exceeds 
approximately EUR 132 500, and to processors whose turnover in Croatia exceeds 
approximately EUR 66 250;  
— Lithuania, whose legislation applies to retailers with significant market power, defined 
as retailers with at least 20 stores and a surface footprint of at least 400 square 
metres in Lithuania and with an aggregate income in the last financial year that is not 
less than EUR 116 million; 
— Poland, whose legislation applies when the business’s trade value in the past 2 years 
or within the UTP practices exceeds approximately EUR 11 900 and when the 
infringer’s (group’s) turnover exceeds approximately EUR 23 867 100;  
— the United Kingdom, whose Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market Investigation 
Order 2009 applies to any retailer with a turnover exceeding GBP 1 billion with 
respect to the retail supply of groceries in the United Kingdom, and which is 
designated in writing as a Designated Retailer. 
The approach under (ii), taking into account the position of SMEs as the potentially 
injured party, is taken (again) in Lithuanian legislation, which does not apply to 
relationships between retailers having significant market power and suppliers whose 
aggregate income during the last financial year exceeds EUR 40 million: larger suppliers, 
as potential victims, are then excluded from the scope of application of the law. A 
comparable approach is only partially taken in Spanish legislation on the functioning of 
the food supply chain, when regulating formal and content requirements of supply 
contracts: indeed, these apply only to transactions whose value exceeds (or is expected 
to exceed) EUR 2 500 and when one of the proxies for unbalanced relations occurs; 
among these proxies, the size of the harmed business as a SME is also considered. 
Rather similarly, in Article 20 of the German Act against Restraints of Competition, abuse 
of relative market power is prohibited only when it involves SMEs as ‘dependent’ 
enterprises. In the Portuguese Decree-Law no 166/2013, whose scope of application is 
general, specific provisions have been provided for the protection of small and micro-
enterprises; moreover, fines are adapted to the size of the infringers.  
As the German and Lithuanian examples show, the reference to the size of involved 
enterprises may be combined with a reference to a situation of superior bargaining power 
of the potential injurer or the economic dependence of the potential injured party. Other 
pieces of legislation specifically focus on abuse of superior bargaining power or 
abuse of economic dependence, so they indirectly exclude from their scope of 
application more equal or balanced relations. This is the case of one of the pieces of 
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legislation in Bulgaria, and in the Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Poland and 
Slovenia.  
The scope of application of the examined legislation is only sometimes tailored on the 
national v. transnational dimension of the supply chain. Recent legislative 
interventions (e.g. in the UK and Ireland) have expressly expanded the scope of 
application of legislation on unfair trade practices in favour of suppliers located outside of 
the national territory. By contrast, the Portuguese Decree-Law no 166/2013 on individual 
restrictive commercial practices used to be applicable only to companies established 
within national territory. Here, a recent reform by Decree-Law no 220/2015 has repealed 
a former provision excluding from the scope of application of Decree-Law no 166/2013 
the purchase and sale of goods and the provision of services originating or terminating in 
a country outside the EU or the European Economic Area. Now, similarly to the Irish law, 
the Portuguese law would apply, for example, to UTPs that occurred within the 
relationship between a Portuguese retailer and a Brazilian supplier. In comparison, in 
Poland, the law on the fraudulent use of contractual advantage in trade and agricultural 
products and groceries applies only to UTPs whose effects occur in Poland; therefore, one 
could argue that it could apply, for example, to UTPs enacted by a foreign retailer against 
a Polish supplier. A similar approach is taken in the Czech Republic. In practice, this 
situation could entail some need for cooperation among administrative authorities in 
different EU countries, whenever, for example, an injunction should be enforced against a 
foreign supplier, if ever admissible. In the Italian legislation, the scope of application is 
linked to the place of the delivery of goods; indeed, the norms apply to the extent that 
such a place is in Italy (see Article 1, Ministerial decree no 199/2012): here the provision 
focuses on the place of delivery rather than on the place in which the UTP effects are 
generated.  
More generally, it should be noted that the ‘source’ of UTPs, especially when based on 
the use of contract terms or business protocols, may be traced back in a different MS 
from the one where the harmed business(es) is/are located and the effects of UTPs are 
produced, either because the supplier trades with a foreign client or because, although 
the contract is stipulated with a local buyer, the latter is ‘controlled’ by a foreign 
company that imposes the contested practice along the chain. Defining the scope of 
application of national legislative instruments and disregarding the international 
dimension of supply chains may lead to relevant practices being left out of the reach of 
the adopted instruments.   
3.2 Modes and extent of prohibition of UTPs  
National legal frameworks are also rather diversified in respect of the modes and extent 
of prohibition of UTPs. As specified above, the present analysis is limited to the legislation 
identified in the 20 MSs that have legislative instruments on UTPs in supply chains, 
without being limited to pre-contractual aggressive and misleading practices or 
misleading advertising (see Table 1). 
UTPs are often prohibited through the use of general clauses and general principles. 
Examples include: 
— prohibition of unequal treatment of entrepreneurs unless objectively justified 
(Austria); 
— prohibition of every act/omission by an undertaking with a stronger bargaining 
position when in conflict with fair business practice and damaging or impairing the 
interest of a weaker party (Bulgaria);  
— prohibition of abuse/exploitation of superior/significant bargaining power (Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Italy, Slovenia); 
— prohibition of abuse of relative market power, consisting of unfair treatment or 
objectively unjustified discrimination in cases of economic dependence of SMEs 
(Germany); 
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— prohibition of abuse of economic dependence (Greece, Cyprus); 
— liability for imposing significant imbalance between parties’ rights and obligations 
(France, Italy); 
— prohibition of imposing unfair contractual advantage contrary to the principles of 
morality and threatening the essential interest of the other party (Poland); 
— prohibition of unfair conduct (Italy, Hungary) or conducts in contrast with fair practice 
(Latvia), of actions contrary to fair business practices (Lithuania), and of unfair 
contractual conditions and unfair trade practices (Slovakia); 
— duty to conduct trading relationships in good faith and in a fair, open and transparent 
manner and to respect the terms and conditions of the agreed contracts (Ireland); 
— duty to comply with principles of transparency, fairness, proportionality and 
reciprocity in contractual obligations (Italy); 
— duty to comply with the ’Principles of good practice in vertical relationships in the food 
supply chain’, developed by the European Commission in the B2B Platform of the High 
Level Forum for a better functioning food supply chain (Italy); 
— duty to comply with principles of balance and fair reciprocity between parties, 
freedom to enter into agreements, goodwill, mutual interest, equitable sharing of 
risks and responsibilities, cooperation, transparency and respect for free market 
competition (Spain); 
— duty to comply with the principle of fair dealing (United Kingdom).  
As shown above, the use of principles and of general clauses are rather diversified across 
MSs not only because different ones are referred to in different systems but also because 
they are differently defined in each legislation. For example, the concept of superior 
bargaining power may be defined as having regard to the volume of sales (as in 
Slovenian law); as the characteristics of the structure of the relevant market and the 
particular legal relationship between the enterprises, taking into consideration the level 
of dependence between them, the nature of their business and the difference in the scale 
thereof, the probability of finding of an alternative trade partner, including the existence 
of alternative supply sources, distribution channels and/or customers (as in Bulgarian 
law); or as having exclusive regard to cases in which economic dependence involve SMEs 
(as in German law). 
As shown in table 4, in only a few cases (Portugal, Romania) prohibitions are listed with 
regard to specific conducts without relying on general clauses and general principles. Also 
rare is the use of general clauses that are not coupled with a list of prohibited 
conducts (e.g. in the German Act against Restraints of Competition). Indeed, in the 
large majority of systems, general principles and general clauses are always 
complemented by either examples or more structured lists of prohibited practices falling 
under the umbrella of the general prohibition. In some cases, it is specified that the list is 
not complete and any other conduct infringing the general prohibition must be penalised 
(e.g. Italy) or that the list provides only examples of prohibited conducts (e.g. Poland); 
in other cases, it is more doubtful whether unlisted conducts may be sanctioned under 
the general prohibition, especially when the general prohibition is very open and the list 
of prohibited conducts rather detailed (as is the case for Hungary). This extension may 
be particularly critical in systems in which enforcement is mainly criminal (Ireland, 
Romania) and the principle of legality may reduce extensive interpretation of law 
identifying crimes.  
The use of lists does not totally eliminate the need for discretionary powers when 
interpreting and applying the rules. Indeed, even when prohibited conducts are listed, 
the use of open terms (such as ‘proportional’, ‘reasonable’, ‘justified’, ‘significant 
imbalance’, etc.) is very common, although diversified across countries. 
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Table 4. Degree of detail and specificity of the legislation on UTPs  
Only general clauses 
and general principles 
Only lists of prohibited 
practices 
General principles, 
general clauses, 
examples or lists of 
prohibited practices 
Germany 
 
Portugal 
Romania 
 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Greece 
Croatia 
Italy 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Hungary 
Austria 
Poland 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
United Kingdom 
When it comes to the specific UTPs covered by examined legislation (dedicated UTP 
legislation in the 20 abovementioned MSs), fragmentation is even wider.  
Table 5 addresses the following practices: 
1. payment periods longer than 30 days; 
2. unilateral and retroactive changes to contracts (concerning volumes, quality 
standards, prices); 
3. contributions to promotional or marketing costs; 
4. claims for wasted or unsold products; 
5. last-minute order cancellations concerning perishable products, or unfair contract 
termination in general; 
6. requests for upfront payments to secure or retain contracts. 
This list of practices is mainly based upon the one proposed in the Report of the 
Agricultural Markets Task Force37, partially complemented by the shorter list of UTPs 
identified by the EC Report in 2016 as ‘core types of UTPs broadly covered by all 
regulatory frameworks’38. It also draws on the FSCI code and the annexed list of 
practices included therein, whose development has contributed to the definition of 
relevant practices.  
                                           
37 Report of the Agricultural Markets Task Force, Enhancing the position of farmers in the supply chain Brussels, 
November 2016. This is the list of prohibitions proposed therein: ‘i. no payment periods longer than 30 
days; ii. no unilateral and retroactive changes to contracts (concerning volumes, quality standards, prices); 
iii. no contributions to promotional or marketing costs; iv. no claims for wasted or unsold products; v. no 
last-minute order cancellations concerning perishable products; vi. no requests for upfront payments to 
secure or retain contracts’ (p. 34, § 113). 
38 See European Commission Communication, Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food 
supply chain, COM 2016 (472) final, listing the following prohibitions: ‘- one party should not ask the other 
party for advantages or benefits of any kind without performing a service related to the advantage or 
benefit asked; - one party should not make unilateral and/or retroactive changes to a contract, unless the 
contract specifically allows for it under fair conditions; - there should be no unfair termination of a 
contractual relationship or unjustified threat of termination of a contractual relationship’ (p. 5). 
 15 
 
More specifically, in the present analysis the concept of ‘last-minute order cancellations 
concerning perishable products’, used by the AMTF, has here been expanded towards a 
more general concept of ‘unfair termination of a contractual relationship’ along the lines 
of the shorter EC list. Compared with the latter, the AMTF list is more selective and less 
dependent on open terms and concepts. So, for example, the AMTF reference to 
prohibition of contributions to promotional or marketing costs could be linked with the 
more general prohibition of asking ‘the other party for advantages or benefits of any kind 
without performing a service related to the advantage or benefit asked’, identified in the 
2016 EC report; and the AMTF reference to prohibition of unilateral and retroactive 
changes to contracts, claims for wasted or unsold products, and requests for upfront 
payments to secure or retain contracts could be read within the more general prohibition 
of ‘duly or unfairly shifting its own costs or entrepreneurial risks to the other party’, 
identified in the 2016 EC report. The reference to unilateral and retroactive changes to 
contracts is common to both lists, although the Commission report explicitly considers 
the possibility that changes may be admitted through contract clauses (this possibility 
will be separately examined below). Payment delays are addressed in only the AMTF list. 
Table 5. UTPs covered by specific national legislation on UTPs 
Selected practices MSs whose UTP legislation covers the 
selected practices 
PAYMENT PERIODS LONGER THAN 30 DAYS 
 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, 
France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, UK 
 
In other MSs, provisions on late payment 
are addressed in the legislation 
implementing the Late Payment Directive 
UNILATERAL AND RETROACTIVE CHANGES TO 
CONTRACTS (CONCERNING VOLUMES, QUALITY 
STANDARDS, PRICES) 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal, UK 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROMOTIONAL OR MARKETING 
COSTS 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Czech Republic, 
France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, UK 
CLAIMS FOR WASTED OR UNSOLD PRODUCTS Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Portugal, Slovenia, UK 
LAST-MINUTE ORDER CANCELLATIONS 
CONCERNING PERISHABLE PRODUCTS, OR UNFAIR 
CONTRACT TERMINATION IN GENERAL 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, 
France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Poland, 
Romania, UK 
REQUESTS FOR UPFRONT PAYMENTS TO SECURE OR 
RETAIN CONTRACTS 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, France, 
Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, UK 
Particularly in this case, figures must be considered as showing general trends rather 
than conclusive evidence. Indeed, some of the listed practices (e.g. payment periods 
longer than 30 days) may be prohibited in other pieces of legislation than those here 
examined (e.g. legislation implementing the Late Payment Directive), or some of the 
specific conducts here considered (e.g. imposition of contribution to promotional 
marketing costs) may be ignored as such by the lists under scrutiny although they are 
addressed through more general prohibitions (e.g. concerning imposition of costs not 
related to the services provided) or through the use of general clauses (e.g. abuse of 
superior bargaining power), as seen above.  
Moving from this clarification and within these limitations, one could observe that even a 
relatively commonly addressed practice (e.g. unfair contract termination) is not 
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specifically referred to in almost half of MSs that specifically regulate UTPs in B2B 
relationships. Other UTPs mentioned (e.g. unilateral and retroactive changes to 
contracts, contributions to promotional and marketing costs, and requests for upfront 
payments to secure or retain contracts) are addressed in fewer than two thirds of these 
MSs’ legislations. No specific prohibition is common to all legal systems, even though, 
once again, the presence of general prohibitions based on fairness may permit coverage 
of these UTPs. 
Even when the same type of practice is covered in several MSs, the mode of regulation 
varies. For example, in Slovenia, payment periods are targeted when they are longer 
than 45 days (rather than 30).  
Another major distinction regards the possibility that some UTPs are exempted if 
business conduct is expressly regulated through contract clauses that parties have 
agreed upon. Two types of provisions should be distinguished in this case: 
— Mere exemption, as shown in the following example: ‘The contract for purchase of 
food for resale cannot: […] 4. be amended unilaterally, unless this is explicitly 
provided for in the contract’ (Article 19.1 of the Bulgarian Foodstuff Act; similar 
provisions are adopted in Latvian and Lithuanian legislation, which also include 
examples of the second type here below). 
— Exemption subject to compliance with contract regulation, as shown in the following 
example: ‘This Regulation prohibits a retailer or wholesaler from varying, terminating 
or renewing a contract with a supplier unless the contract expressly provides for 
such variation, termination or renewal or agreed circumstances when such 
variation, termination or renewal can occur. Thus, unilateral retrospective 
variations are not permitted. In addition, the agreed contract must specify the period 
of written notice that must be given prior to any such variation, termination or 
renewal. The period of such notice will be reasonable and have regards to all the 
circumstances of the contract, including:  
● the duration of the contract; 
● the frequency with which orders are placed by the retailer or wholesaler for the 
grocery goods concerned; 
● the characteristics of the grocery goods concerned including the durability, 
seasonality and external factors affecting their production; and 
● the value of any order relative to the annual turnover of the supplier in question’. 
(Regulation 5, Irish Consumer Protection Act 2007 (Grocery Goods Undertakings) 
Regulations 2016 (S.I. No 35 of 2016); emphasis added). Similar provisions are adopted 
in Spain and the United Kingdom, and, together with examples of the first type of 
provisions above, in Latvian and Lithuanian legislation. 
Whereas the former type of exemption may create room for abuse when drafting contract 
clauses, the latter type limits this risk by adopting contractual procedures or specifying 
requirements for contractual exemption. 
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4 The enforcement triangle and its current weaknesses 
The enforcement of UTPs is decentralised. It is based on a triangle including 
administrative, judicial and private dispute resolution. MSs are responsible for detecting 
and sanctioning both domestic and trans-border infringements. Not only substantive 
rules describing unfair trade practices but also enforcement mechanisms have been 
introduced by the MSs’ legislations to address an enforcement gap. The new legislation 
adds to and does not replace general rules in civil codes or statutory instruments. 
The enforcement mechanisms comprise adjudication by courts aimed at compensation for 
damages, restitution of unduly paid sums and invalidity of clauses in contracts. Some 
MSs also include a criminal aspect and consider UTPs civil, administrative and criminal 
infringements. Increasingly, judicial enforcement has been complemented by 
administrative enforcement with sanctioning powers, including fines and, to a limited 
extent, injunctions. Administrative enforcers include competition authorities, ministries of 
agriculture and national agencies39. Often, multiple administrative bodies with 
enforcement powers are in place. Competition authorities are responsible both for unfair 
practices that constitute anticompetitive infringements and for non-competition aspects 
of UTPs when, for example, the infringer that engages in unfair practices is not in a 
dominant position. In addition, some MSs have identified other administrative authorities, 
complementing the competition authorities, that either focus on the protection of SMEs in 
agriculture or deliver recommendations and opinions using cooperative rather than 
command-and-control enforcement. The introduction of administrative enforcement is 
mostly linked to the adoption of dedicated legislation on UTPs in supply chains. Indeed, in 
all MSs adopting such legislation, some type of administrative enforcement has been 
provided. Whereas in several cases existing authorities have been empowered (mainly 
competition or consumer and competition authorities), in other cases newly dedicated 
administrative authorities have been established, as shown in table 6. 
                                           
39 See European Commission Report (2016): ‘Member States have appointed different national enforcement 
authorities to address UTPs. This is sometimes the national competition authority and in other cases a 
dedicated body, such as a national ministry, a national food agency, or a national anti-fraud agency’. 
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Table 6. MSs and main enforcing authorities 
MS Main enforcing authority as regards UTP legislation  
BULGARIA Commission of Protection of Competition (CPC) 
CZECH REPUBLIC Office for the Protection of Competition 
GERMANY Competition Authority (CA) 
(although injunctions are imposed by courts; the CA may file a 
request) 
IRELAND Competition and Consumer Protection Commission 
GREECE Court 
SPAIN Administration of Autonomous Community or General State 
Administration 
(depending on territorial dimension of UTPs:) 
FRANCE Direction générale de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes  (DGCCRF, General Directorate for Competition 
Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control, within the Ministry for the 
Economy and Finance) 
CROATIA Competition Authority 
ITALY Competition Authority 
CYPRUS Commission for the Protection of Competition 
LATVIA Competition Council 
LITHUANIA Competition Council 
HUNGARY National Food Chain Safety Office 
AUSTRIA Court 
(administrative authorities, e.g. Federal Competition Authority, have 
standing to start judicial proceedings) 
POLAND Office of Competition and Consumer Protection 
PORTUGAL ASAE (Autoridade Administrativa Nacional Especializada, Specialised 
National Administrative Authority) 
ROMANIA Consumer Protection Authority and Ministry of Finance  
(depending on UTP) 
SLOVENIA Slovenian Competition Protection Agency 
SLOVAKIA Ministry of Agriculture And Rural Development 
UNITED KINGDOM Grocery Code Adjudicator 
MS HAVING LIMITED-SCOPE LEGISLATION  
(MAINLY FOCUSED ON CONSUMER-TYPE MISLEADING AND AGGRESSIVE PRACTICES) 
BELGIUM Commercial Court 
DENMARK Court 
FINLAND  Market Court 
SWEDEN Market Court 
 
Other features of administrative enforcement concern the possibility of investigating and 
penalising multiple infringements with multiple injured parties. Administrative 
enforcement can focus either on single infringers and single injured parties or on multiple 
ones. In the latter case, the effects on markets are wider and deeper. Administrative 
enforcement, unlike judicial enforcement, takes account of repeat infringements. Power 
to punish can be adjusted accordingly when the infringer has previously engaged in the 
same or similar unlawful conduct.  
Administrative bodies may (1) either only have investigative powers and refer to courts 
for enforcement, or (2) hold both investigative and sanctioning powers. When they can 
 19 
 
only investigate, they may bring actions before the court without prejudice to the rights 
to effective judicial protection of individuals injured by the UTPs 40. In the latter case, 
these powers have to be exercised by separate units or legal entities in order to comply 
with due process and good administration requirements.  
The complement of enforcement mechanisms also includes private regimes that can be 
either voluntary or mandatory, and are characterised by the extensive use of market and 
reputational sanctions. The pillar of private bodies applying codes of conduct represents 
the third side of the triangle. This is supported at EU level by the Food Supply Chain 
Initiative (FSCI)41. Enforcement of codes of practices may follow a different path. 
Compliance with codes of practice can be ensured by private bodies such as the FSCI 
platforms, by public enforcers, including administrative bodies (UK Grocery Code 
Adjudicator) and courts, and by hybrid bodies composed of members of the public 
administration and representatives of the various interests involved, such as the Code 
Oversight Committee in Spain. 
What is the relative weight of each of the enforcement mechanisms? Why and how do 
they complement each other? No legislation imposes alternative routes. Injured parties 
can access the three enforcement mechanisms. The enforcement triangle, including 
judicial, administrative and private resolution mechanisms, represents a relatively 
common feature in MSs (see Figure 1). What differs is their combination and modes of 
interaction. Hardly any national legislation coordinates judicial and administrative 
enforcement. Similarly, no effective coordination exists between the enforcers of the 
supply chain initiatives (FSCI national platforms) and the judicial and administrative 
enforcers.  
The relative weight of each enforcement mechanism has changed over time. 
Administrative enforcement has gained more importance in comparison with 
adjudication. The rise of administrative enforcement can partly be explained by the lack 
of incentives for producers’ and more generally ‘victims’ to use the judicial system. In 
long-term relationships characterised by economic dependence between the parties, 
litigation is generally regarded as the final option, and farmers might not be able or 
willing to afford such a risk. Administrative enforcement with ex officio power shields 
farmers from the danger of retaliation and better preserves the continuation of the 
business relationship with large buyers.  
The complementarity concerns both procedures and sanctions/remedies.  
Complementarity implies differences in approaches and in instruments. The resolution of 
private disputes is usually characterised by a strong(er) collaborative approach between 
enforcers and parties. Sanctions are limited whereas remedies are primarily reputational, 
although some private adjudicators can also issue injunctions and fines. Administrative 
enforcement features both collaborative and command-and-control enforcement 
depending on the approach. The principal instruments used to prevent and deter are 
fines and injunctions. Adjudication before courts follows the adversarial model and 
focuses on injunctions, restitution and compensation. 
                                           
40 See, for example, France, where the DGCCRF can start a civil action and seek judicial remedies including civil 
penalties (ammèndes civiles) (see Article 442-6, Code de commerce); for different UTPs, the Competition 
Authority can impose administrative sanctions (see Articles 470-2 and 441-7, Code de commerce). See 
Ireland, where the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission monitors compliance with the 
regulations (including through the Annual Reports of enterprises), whereas criminal and civil courts 
adjudicate the criminal sanctions (criminal courts) and civil remedies (restitution and damages, civil 
courts). See also, for the UK, Draft Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill,§ 36. ‘If the Adjudicator concludes that 
a large retailer has broken the Groceries Code it may make recommendations under clause 8, require 
information to be published under clause 9 or impose financial penalties under clause 10 (but financial 
penalties may only be used if the Secretary of State has made an order allowing this — see also Schedule 
3).’  
41 See www.supplychaininitiative.eu. 
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Figure 1. The enforcement triangle 
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Judicial Private (FSCI) 
(civil and criminal)  
 
 
 
 
The three pillars constitute the enforcement triangle that should address the enforcement 
gap in UTPs. Their coordination at MS level is currently very limited. A lack of 
coordination, together with some design fallacies, undermines the effectiveness of 
decentralised enforcement and prompts the call for a better integrated approach at both 
MS and EU levels. An integrated approach requires coordination between enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure that each performs its functions without duplications and 
overlaps. But the most important feature is coordination among MSs, both among 
administrative enforcers and between them and criminal and civil courts. In each 
enforcement mechanism it is necessary to define a sequence of administrative and 
judicial procedures and to regulate the legal force of administrative decisions in judicial 
proceedings, the possibility of using evidence and the solution of potential conflicts 
between final decisions. 
The operation of the enforcement triangle becomes even more problematic when multiple 
injurers and multiple injured parties belonging to different MSs or to states outside the 
EU are involved. Administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms have different 
rules concerning extraterritoriality. Their complementarity when injured parties and 
infringers are located in different states may have different features from those related to 
UTPs whose geographic scope rests within a single MS. 
In the case of trans-border infringements within the EU, one of the open questions is that 
of the extent of the power of national enforcers to investigate and punish infringements 
that start from a foreign MS and have effects in their own state or start from their own 
MS and have effects in other MSs. 
Administrative enforcers can fine traders for UTPs whose effects are outside their MS. 
Some MSs specifically provide for this power even in relation to outside EU producers 
(UK, Ireland). Other MSs establish a principle of reciprocity (Austria). Accordingly, 
protection of non-national producers is warranted as long as the same protection would 
be granted to national producers before the foreign administrative authority. Other MSs 
explicitly circumscribe the scope of protection to their national businesses injured by 
UTPs (Poland). At the moment, administrative authorities normally do not pursue 
infringements that start in a different jurisdiction. For example, under the current 
legislation the Italian administrative enforcer can take action against infringements 
committed by Italian retailers against foreign producers but does not generally take 
action against infringements committed by foreign retailers against Italian producers. It 
is generally believed that action should be taken against infringements where the 
infringers are legally established or where the decision to infringe has been made. In 
addition, even if authorities order a fine they lack power to enforce it if the infringer does 
not pay.  
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Judicial enforcement against UTPs becomes problematic when there are multiple 
infringers and multiple injured parties located in different MSs42. Whether a single law 
could be applicable to the same infringement or different laws should be applied 
depending on where the infringers are located is an open question. Even more 
problematic is the case when injured parties are partly located in EU MSs and partly 
outside the EU. Access to enforcement systems by non-EU producers follows different 
patterns in judicial and administrative enforcement. Some new legislation (e.g. that of 
the UK) has broadened the scope of enforcement beyond EU borders, making it 
accessible for non-EU producers.  
4.1 Administrative enforcement 
As shown in Table 6, the most recent MS legislation has introduced forms of 
administrative enforcement in addition to judicial enforcement and to private dispute 
resolution mechanisms. It is an attempt to address the enforcement gap related to the 
very limited use of courts and the low effectiveness of private dispute resolution 
mechanisms. It is partly driven by the so called ‘fear factor’ that prevents farmers from 
using courts, as they fear commercial retaliation with the termination of the commercial 
relationship and their forced exit from the chain. 
When established, administrative authorities generally have both investigatory and 
sanctioning powers. However, in some cases the power to impose injunctions and/or 
sanctions is conferred on the court while the administrative authority holds only 
investigative power (Ireland) and the power to start the judicial procedure (e.g. France 
for practices under L-442-6, Code de commerce). Table 7 provides additional evidence on 
this aspect. 
  
                                           
42 With special regard to applicable law, see S. Clavel, Cross-border B2B unfair trading practices, in A. Renda, F. 
Cafaggi and J. Pelkmans, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business Unfair Trading 
Practices in the Retail Supply Chain, 2014, section 2.3, pp. 84-88. 
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Table 7. Enforcement, authorities and relative power 
N/A: information not available  
Type of 
enforcement 
MS Main 
enforcing 
authority 
Injunctive power Power to impose 
fines 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY COURTS 
GREECE Court N/A N/A 
AUSTRIA Court  Court 
(Competition 
Authority, among 
other interested 
parties, may seek 
injunction) 
 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY COMPETITION 
AUTHORITIES 
BULGARIA Commission of 
Protection of 
Competition 
(CPC) 
CPC CPC 
    
CZECH REPUBLIC Office for the 
Protection of 
Competition 
Office for the 
Protection of 
Competition 
(may assess and 
accept voluntary 
commitments) 
Office for the 
Protection of 
Competition 
CROATIA Competition 
Authority 
N/A 
(CA may assess 
and accept 
voluntary 
commitments) 
Competition 
Authority 
ITALY Competition 
Authority 
Competition 
Authority 
Competition 
Authority 
LATVIA Competition 
Council 
 Competition Council 
LITHUANIA Competition 
Council 
Competition 
Council 
Competition Council 
POLAND Office of 
Competition 
and Consumer 
Protection 
Office of 
Competition and 
Consumer 
Protection 
(may assess and 
accept voluntary 
commitments) 
Office of 
Competition and 
Consumer Protection 
SLOVENIA Slovenian 
Competition 
Protection 
Agency 
 Slovenian 
Competition 
Protection Agency 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
AUTHORITY 
ROMANIA Consumer 
Protection 
Authority 
 Consumer Protection 
Authority 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY DEDICATED 
ENFORCING 
AUTHORITIES 
HUNGARY National Food 
Chain Safety 
Office 
National Food 
Chain Safety Office 
(at least for 
prohibition of 
using unfair terms) 
National Food Chain 
Safety Office 
PORTUGAL Autoridade 
Administrativa 
Nacional 
Especializada 
 ASAE 
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Type of 
enforcement 
MS Main 
enforcing 
authority 
Injunctive power Power to impose 
fines 
(ASAE) 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Grocery Code 
Adjudicator 
Grocery Code 
Adjudicator 
(may issue 
recommendations) 
 
Grocery Code 
Adjudicator 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY STATE OR 
LOCAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
    
SPAIN Administration 
of 
Autonomous 
Community or 
General State 
Administration 
 Administration of 
Autonomous 
Community or 
General State 
Administration 
SLOVAKIA Ministry of 
Agriculture 
and Rural 
Development 
 Ministry of 
Agriculture And 
Rural Development 
COMBINED 
ENFORCEMENT 
BETWEEN 
COURTS AND 
COMPETITION 
AUTHORITIES 
    
    
GERMANY Competition 
Authority 
Court 
(CA may seek 
injunction) 
Competition 
Authority 
IRELAND Competition 
and Consumer 
Protection 
Commission 
 Court 
FRANCE DGCCRF 
(Ministry for 
the Economy 
and Finance) 
Court 
(Article 442-6, 
Code de 
commerce) 
(Ministry for the 
Economy and 
Finance and CA, 
among other 
interested parties, 
may seek 
injunction) 
Competition 
Authority 
(Article 470-2, Code 
de commerce) 
CYPRUS Commission 
for the 
Protection of 
Competition 
Court Commission for the 
Protection of 
Competition 
4.1.1 Investigative powers 
Administrative enforcers are required to apply rules based either on legislation or on 
private regulation. Often, as is the case in the UK, the enforcer solves disputes related to 
the application of a code of conduct. 
Limited resources and the necessity to identify priorities in tackling UTPs require strategic 
decision making on the part of the administrative enforcer. The investigation strategy is 
generally determined by the enforcer, which defines priorities and scope of 
investigations. In some legislation, priorities are statutorily defined; in others, they are 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Only a few countries (such as the UK) have defined 
criteria and priority setting to be followed in the legislation, including the impact of the 
practice and the effects of its removal. Administrative enforcers publish an annual report 
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in which they specify their strategic priorities for the future and their past 
achievements43. 
Enforcers use primarily inspections but can also promote self-reporting by retailers in 
order to reduce asymmetry of information and save costs. Those enforcers that engage 
in a continuous dialogue with the infringers rely more on self-reporting and surveys than 
on individual inspections. Collaborative models first address the potential infringer and 
ask them to investigate and report44. If the investigation is inadequate or the reported 
infringement does not stop, the enforcer can switch to inspections and other more 
intrusive monitoring instruments, moving from a cooperative to a command-and-control 
enforcement approach. 
During investigations, enforcers have to respect procedural rules based on national 
administrative laws and the right to good administration, a general principle recognised 
at both EU and MS levels. Procedural guarantees for the potential infringer increase at 
the enforcement level if the administrative body decides that there are sufficient grounds 
to proceed. 
Typically, enforcers can act ex officio or on the basis of parties’ complaints45. More 
specifically, in almost all MSs, UTP legislation empowers administrative authorities to act 
ex officio46. In most MSs (see Table 8) complaints can be anonymous in order to protect 
the complainants from retaliation, although confidentiality needs to be balanced with the 
effectiveness of the investigation and the right of defence of potential infringers47. Many 
administrative enforcers allow anonymous complaints but preserve the discretionary 
power to start investigations.  
                                           
43 See, for example, in France the DGCCRF, which has established each year a programme for investigation 
(source: questionnaire-based DG AGRI consultation of MS experts, October-November 2017, see 
Acknowledgments at the beginning of this Report). 
44 See UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and Groceries Code Adjudicator, Statutory 
Review of the Groceries Code Adjudicator: 2013-2016, July 2017, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-code-adjudicator-statutory-review-2013-to-2016: 
‘GCA approach to investigations: 42. The Adjudicator has chosen to take a collaborative approach and 
describes a three-stage process that is designed to address and resolve issues quickly whilst retaining the 
option to move to an investigation if necessary. This process consists of: • Alerting large retailers when 
Code-related issues are raised with the Adjudicator by suppliers; • Requesting that the large retailer Code 
Compliance Officers (CCOs) internally look into the issues; and • Report back to the Adjudicator, identifying 
any business changes made to address the issue raised (if necessary).’ 
45 See European Commission Report (2016) p. 7: ‘Own-initiative investigations launched by the enforcement 
authority are another important element in addressing the fear factor. They enable the victim of an unfair 
practice to inform the authority about alleged UTPs imposed by a stronger party, thereby triggering an own 
initiative investigation if the enforcement authority believes that there are sufficient grounds.’ 
46 Austria would represent the only exception as shown by the data collected within the Directorate-General for 
Agriculture and Rural Development survey (2017) mentioned in the Acknowledgments at the beginning of 
this Report. However, in this case, the Local Supply Act, § 14, vests associations representing business 
collective interests with the power to start proceedings before the court for a cease and desist order.  
47 See, for example, in the Lithuanian law on the prohibition of unfair practices of retailers, Article 5.2: ‘Upon a 
reasoned request of a supplier who has submitted to the Competition Council the application specified in 
Article 8(1) of this Law and/or the documents and other information necessary for performing the functions 
of the Competition Council, the data identifying the supplier shall not be made public and disclosed.’ 
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Table 8. Confidentiality of complaints lodged with administrative authorities and ex officio 
investigative powers in UTP legislation examined (N/A: information not available) 
MS Confidential complaints Ex officio investigative 
powers 
BULGARIA YES YES 
CZECH REPUBLIC YES YES 
GERMANY YES YES 
IRELAND YES YES 
GREECE N/A N/A 
SPAIN YES YES 
FRANCE YES YES 
CROATIA N/A YES 
ITALY YES YES 
CYPRUS N/A YES 
LATVIA YES YES 
LITHUANIA YES YES 
HUNGARY YES YES 
AUSTRIA YES No, but law provides 
standing of administrative 
authority and business 
organisations 
POLAND YES YES 
PORTUGAL NO YES 
ROMANIA NO N/A 
SLOVENIA YES YES 
SLOVAKIA NO YES 
UNITED KINGDOM YES YES 
The possibility of lodging a complaint does not necessarily imply the status of a party 
within the administrative proceeding concerning the potential infringement. When no 
specific provisions exist, national administrative laws determine who can lodge a 
complaint and who can be a party to the proceeding. Among the parties that can lodge 
complaints before administrative authorities, some MSs include producers’ organisations 
and farmers’ associations, as shown in Table 9. Moreover, in some MSs the producers’ 
organisations lodging the complaints can also participate in the proceedings (e.g. 
Hungary, Italy)48. Their role may be extremely useful to present the views of those 
harmed by the practices, who generally do not have the right to participate. Examples 
include those presented in Table 9. 
                                           
48 See for example section 5 of the Hungarian Act (2009): ‘(1) The professional organisation representing the 
interest of suppliers may assume the position of a client (melius party) in any administrative proceeding 
initiated for the violation of this Act’ (unofficial translation); Article 8, Italian Competition Authority 
Regulations on investigation procedures in the field of UTPs in agri-food contractual relationships: 
‘Participation into the investigation phase. 1. Public or private stakeholders established as associations, that 
may be prejudiced by the infringements addressed by the investigation, may intervene in the pending 
procedure’ (unofficial translation).  
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Table 9. Empowerment of enterprises’ associations in the administrative enforcement of UTP 
legislation (examples)  
MS Power of trade or professional 
associations to lodge complaints for 
the enforcement of UTP legislation 
before administrative authorities 
(examples) 
CYPRUS Power to lodge complaints with the 
Competition Commission 
CZECH REPUBLIC Power to lodge complaints with the 
Competition Commission 
GERMANY Power to lodge complaints with the Federal 
Cartel Office 
HUNGARY Power to be party to administrative 
proceedings for enforcement of UTP 
legislation, representing collective interests 
ITALY Power to seek injunctions before the CA in 
representation of collective interests; 
power to lodge complaints and to intervene 
in investigation procedures 
In some models, the enforcer engages with suppliers and meets regularly with them or 
their representatives to learn about UTPs49.  
4.1.2 Enforcement stricto sensu 
Administrative enforcement includes a number of approaches from soft to hard. As we 
suggested in relation to investigation, enforcement strictosensu can include both a 
collaborative and a command-and-control approach. The former tries to establish a 
cooperative relationship between enforcers and infringers before and after the 
infringement. The latter does not engage with the infringer before any infringement has 
taken place and, within the due process guarantees, proceeds with sanctions and 
injunctions after the infringement has materialised. The collaborative approach addresses 
both causes and consequences of the infringement. The command-and-control approach 
focuses on the consequences but does not address the causes. 
Some MSs have legislatively defined general principles that should guide administrative 
authorities exercising sanctioning powers, including deterrence or dissuasiveness and 
proportionality (e.g. the UK). In other MSs, the specific criteria have been determined by 
the competent authority in guidelines or similar soft law instruments (e.g. Ireland). 
MSs practices show that collaborative approaches may deliver better results than 
conventional sanctioning regimes. The different tools are often combined and scaled. In 
some cases, the enforcer can first issue recommendations and advice and, if they are not 
followed, can impose penalties. In other cases, the enforcer can only penalise. However, 
even in the latter case, cooperative enforcement takes place informally at the stage of 
investigation. On the infringer’s side, there can also be an alternative to sanctions, an 
alternative which is normally limited to non-serious infringements. The infringer is given 
the possibility to propose commitments and the enforcer has discretionary power to 
either accept the proposal without declaring the infringement or reject the proposal and 
move to the sanctioning stage once the infringement has been ascertained. 
We distinguish between enforcement stricto sensu and forms of public dispute resolutions 
mechanisms that include negotiations. Within enforcement we include conventional 
command-and-control approaches as well as forms of cooperative enforcement, where 
                                           
49 This is the case for the Grocery Code Adjudicator in the UK, where promotion of dialogue between suppliers 
and retailers is one of the main tasks. 
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there is joint problem-solving between enforcer and infringer. In the cooperative 
approach, the enforcer preserves the power to accept or reject proposals made by the 
infringer. We do not include conciliation procedures promoted by administrative bodies. 
Administrative enforcement varies according to both practices and the seriousness of the 
infringement. Some MSs distinguish between major and minor infringements and adapt 
the sanctioning policy accordingly50. Other MSs do not expressly make the distinction in 
legislation but adopt it in practice by scaling the type and the amount of sanctions (e.g. 
in the case of fines) according to the gravity of the violation (see Table 11). 
Some MSs distinguish the seriousness of infringements by ‘ranking’ them; the 
sanctioning system reflects these ranked differences. Certain infringements result in 
harder sanctions than others (see below, section 4.1.3 and Table 11). 
When UTP legislation has been specifically adopted, there is usually at least one 
administrative enforcer at MS level. Even when the enforcer is the competition authority, 
it should be clarified that its power to act is based not on competition law but on specific 
legislation to combat UTPs. Competition authorities can therefore pursue different routes 
against the same UTP with different units or a general unit can investigate both the 
competition and the non-competition facets of the infringement. When no specific 
legislation on UTPs exists, competition authorities can verify and punish only 
anticompetitive aspects, while the other aspects are left to adjudication before courts. 
Sometimes an additional enforcer is identified to focus on specific questions, related, for 
example, to SMEs’ protection.  
The administrative enforcer follows an administrative procedure in which it performs both 
investigation and adjudication. The two phases are procedurally distinguished in order to 
guarantee due process rights. A situation where the same entity investigates and 
adjudicates on its own investigation must be avoided. This separation can be structural, 
when two different bodies are in charge of investigation and adjudication; or it can be 
functional, when, within the same entity, two separate units are in charge. Procedural 
guarantees include the right to be informed, the right to be heard, the right of defence 
and the right to appeal. The procedure ends with an administrative decision that can be 
appealed before a court. 
4.1.3 The correlation between practices and sanctions  
Sometimes, legislations provide different types of enforcement depending on the type of 
practices, as shown in Table 10. For example, in France, restrictive practices addressed 
by Article 442-6, Code de commerce, are subject to judicial injunctions and ammendes 
civile (civil fines). Other practices, for example in the area of payment delays or 
negotiation of distribution contracts (Article 441-7 and 441-8, Code de commerce), are 
subject to administrative fines by administrative authorities. 
Moreover, not all the practices are equally serious violations. Some MSs, such as Spain, 
explicitly determine the seriousness of the violation in relation to the specific practice. For 
example, under Spanish law, violation of the written form of a contract constitutes a 
minor infringement, whereas delay of payment constitutes a serious infringement. The 
legislative technique usually deployed is the distinction between major and minor or 
serious and non-serious infringements. When the legislator does not explicitly make 
these differences, the enforcer, exercising discretion, can use the general principles of 
proportionality and deterrence to distinguish among practices and define some kind of 
hierarchy.  
                                           
50 This is the case for Spain, as shown in Table 10, here below.  
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Table 10. Examples of correlation between practices and fines 
MS Practices/fines 
CROATIA Depending on the gravity and the significance of the infringement, the 
UTPs Act recognises fines for most serious infringements, serious 
infringements, minor infringements and other infringements. 
Most serious infringements:  
- up to EUR 662 556.81 equivalent (legal persons); 
- EUR 331 278.41 equivalent (physical persons). 
Lower caps are listed for serious and minor infringements. 
FRANCE Administrative fines (infringements of Article L441-7,8, retail 
contracts). 
Ammende civile (civil fines) (infringements of Article L 442-6, restrictive 
practices). 
ITALY Different fines depending on UTP (contracts vs practices vs payment 
delay/practices). 
Infringements concerning the use of written form for agri-food 
contracts and the contents requirements of such contracts: EUR 1 000-
40 000. 
UTPs during execution and in cases of unfair termination: EUR 2 000-
50 000. 
Violation of payment terms: EUR 500-500 000. 
SPAIN Distinction between minor and serious offences is based on the type of 
UTPs: 
EUR 3 000 (minor offences)  
EUR 100 000 (serious offences) 
EUR 1 000 000 (very serious offences) 
Examples of minor food procurement contracting infringements: failure 
to draw up a written food procurement contract as specified in the 
specific legislation; introducing changes in the terms of the contract 
that were explicitly agreed by the parties; requiring additional 
payments over the price agreed in the contract, except in the cases 
provided for in this law. 
Example of serious infringements: failure to comply with payment 
periods in commercial transactions involving food or food products. 
Repeat infringements: two or more minor offences within 2 years as 
from the date of issue of the final administrative decision of the first 
one: a serious offence. Two or more serious offences within 2 years as 
from the date of issue of the final administrative decision of the first 
one: a very serious offence.  
 
4.1.4 Commitments, recommendations and sanctions 
Following a consolidated trend in administrative enforcement, some new legislations 
provide the infringer with the possibility to voluntarily cease the infringement and provide 
compensation for the infringement . The possibility to undertake commitments is 
generally associated with the (low) gravity of the violation and is an alternative to 
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sanctions. In some MSs, the infringers can submit a proposal that can be accepted or 
rejected by the enforcer (e.g. Croatia, Hungary). When the infringement is serious, 
commitments may not be allowed and the enforcer issues both a fine and an injunction. 
In other MSs, the enforcer issues recommendations which are not legally binding. 
Following the recommendations, the infringer submits an action plan, the implementation 
of which is monitored by the enforcer51. If the action plan is not complied with, the 
enforcer can move to conventional enforcement practice and order a sanction. 
Commitments 
Commitments represent a cooperative approach to enforcement. Commitments can 
result in an undertaking from the infringer to cease and desist from the violation and to 
remove the consequences of the infringement. Commitments may be offered by the 
infringer and evaluated by the enforcer (which can accept them, or reject them if they 
seem inadequate)52. Commitments can be part of an agreement between the authority 
and the infringer that is legally binding and judicially enforceable. However, the 
incentives to comply with commitments are related to the possibility of scaling up to 
sanctions by the administrative authority. Indeed, commitments are often backed by 
conditional fines (astreintes) (e.g. in Polish legislation). 
One of the open questions concerns the effects of commitments on the injured party, 
especially when commitments become binding. Can the ‘victim’ of the infringement bring 
a civil action for failure to comply with the commitments, or does the implementation of 
the commitment remain an issue between the administrative enforcer and the infringer? 
The answer to this question depends on whether or not national legal systems qualify the 
binding agreement with the commitment as an enforceable agreement or even a contract 
and whether or not the third party beneficiary doctrine applies. If the agreement can be 
considered a third party beneficiary contract, the victim should be able to sue for the 
breach of the commitment before a civil court. On the one hand, this can provide 
additional incentives to the infringer and increase monitoring by the parties who suffer 
harm in the event of non-compliance. On the other hand, the infringer may consider this 
too high a burden and decide not to propose the commitment in the first place. If the 
agreement is not a third party beneficiary contract, enforcement is left exclusively to the 
administrative enforcer. 
Clearly, even if the commitments produce no direct effects on the victim, failure to 
comply may be taken into account by the civil court when compensation and/or 
restitution is sought by the injured party. 
Recommendations 
In the UK model, the enforcer makes (not legally binding) recommendations at the end 
of the investigation. Compliance with recommendations is driven by persuasion rather 
than by legal authority. After an investigation, the Grocery Code Adjudicator (GCA) can 
                                           
51 This is the model of the Grocery Code Adjudicator in the UK. 
52 See, for example, the Croatian legislation, Act on the prohibition of unfair trading practices in the business-
to-business food supply chain, Official Gazette 117/17: ‘Within the investigation the CCA [Croatian Competition 
Authority] decides whether the proposed measures are sufficient for the elimination of the UTPs, taking into 
account the gravity, scope and the duration of the infringement. If the CCA finds the proposed 
commitments acceptable and sufficient for the elimination of the UTPs, it issues an interim decision on the 
basis of which these commitments become binding for the party that must provide evidence on the 
fulfilment of these measures within a prescribed deadline. Where the party submits this evidence, the CCA 
decides to terminate the proceeding without establishing the infringement of the rules concerned and without 
imposing any sanctions’ (unofficial translation, emphasis added). A similar provision is in the Hungarian Act XCV 
of 2009 on the prohibition of unfair distributor conduct vis-à-vis suppliers regarding agricultural and food 
industry products. Section 8.1 states: ‘(1) If, prior to the adoption of a resolution by the agricultural 
administrative authority on the merits of the case, the trader affected undertakes in writing to align its conduct 
to the provisions of this Act in a set manner, and public interest can be served this way, the agricultural 
administrative authority may adopt an order that renders the performance of the undertaking obligatory, 
simultaneously terminating the proceeding, ordering the trader to pay the procedural costs, without including 
the establishment of infringement or non-infringement in the order’ (unofficial translation). 
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decide to issue a report and make recommendations or use its sanctioning power53. It 
generally follows a scaling strategy and issues recommendations that ask the infringer to 
report on their progress.  
A partially similar model is used in France, where a Commission for unfair trade practices 
(Commission pour pratiques deloyales) issues opinions (avis) that are not legally binding 
but generally followed by the courts. The difference between recommendations and 
commitments is that recommendations are usually issued by the ‘enforcer’, whereas 
commitments are usually submitted by the infringer and either accepted or rejected by 
the administrative body. Recommendations concern not only the substantive part (e.g. 
what constitutes a UTP) but can also deal with the remedial side of the issue. For 
example, the French Commission for unfair trade practices has explicitly stated that it is 
possible to combine injunctive relief and invalidity54. The Cour de Cassation in France 
makes references to the opinion of the Commission when deciding about remedies 
related to UTPs.  
Sanctions 
The new legislation regulating UTPs introduces administrative sanctions. All include 
financial penalties in the form of fines. Some also add injunctions and declaratory 
decisions. Damages and restitution are instead usually left to judicial enforcement.  
Regarding fines, variations across different MSs’ legislations are remarkable. Most MSs 
have determined both a minimum and a maximum level of fine. Some MSs define only a 
maximum. In some instances, the maximum fine can be the lower sum between a 
threshold and the amount of revenues of the infringer55.  
When infringers do not comply with the administrative orders to cease the UTP, they can 
be charged with additional fines for non-compliance. The amount of these fines varies 
quite significantly, as shown in Table 11. In some cases, it is a daily sum for each day of 
non-compliance, in other cases it is a lump sum. 
                                           
53 See, for example, the case of Tesco, which was found in breach of the code. See UK Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and Groceries Code Adjudicator, Statutory Review of the Groceries 
Code Adjudicator: 2013-2016, cit., p. 37: “The GCA made five recommendations, requiring Tesco to: 1) 
pay money owed to suppliers in accordance with the agreed terms of payment; 2) not make unilateral 
deductions; 3) resolve promptly data input errors identified by suppliers; 4) provide transparency and 
clarity in dealings with suppliers; 5) train finance teams and buyers in the findings from the investigation. 
Tesco was required to submit an implementation plan within four weeks of publication of these 
recommendations and to provide regular reports on progress to the GCA. Tesco accepted and implemented 
all the recommendations in full. The GCA’s full report is available at 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/gca-investigation-into-tesco-plc”. 
54 See CEPC, avis n° 14-02, 13 févr. 2014, holding that, when a UTP consists in an unfair clause the injured 
party can seek both an injunctive relief and the nullity of the specific clause. 
55 See, for example, section 6 of the Hungarian Act on the prohibition of unfair distributor conduct vis-à-vis 
suppliers regarding agricultural and food industry products. Section 6.2 states ‘(2) The minimum amount of 
the product path supervisory fine is one hundred thousand Hungarian forints, while its maximum amounts 
to five hundred million Hungarian forints; however, it may not exceed ten percent of the net revenue 
attained by the trader in the business year preceding the issue of the resolution that establishes the 
violation’. 
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Table 11. Minimum and maximum thresholds for the imposition of fines (UTP legislation 
examined; when applicable, currency exchange rates refer to January 2018) 
MS Pecuniary 
sanctions 
Minimum/maximum/
no thresholds 
Minimum 
pecuniary 
sanctions 
Maximum 
pecuniary 
sanctions 
% 
turnover 
(t.o.) 
BULGARIA X Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 5 000 EUR 25 000 
(in case t.o. is 
0) 
Up to 10% 
(t.o. of the 
product 
concerned) 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
X Only maximum 
thresholds 
 EUR 3914100
0 
Up to 10% 
GERMANY X Only maximum 
thresholds 
 EUR 1 million Up to 10% 
IRELAND X 
(criminal) 
Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 3 000 EUR 100 000  
GREECE N/A Only maximum 
thresholds 
 EUR 50 000 N/A 
SPAIN X Minimum/maximum 
threshold 
EUR 3 000 
(minor 
offences) 
EUR 1 000 00
0 (very 
serious 
offences) 
EUR 100 000 
(serious 
offences) 
 
FRANCE X 
Administrativ
e fines 
(infringement
s of Article 
L441-7,8) 
Ammende 
civile 
(infringement
s of Article L 
442-6) 
Only maximum 
thresholds 
 Administrative 
fines: 
EUR 75 000 
(individuals) 
EUR 375 000 
(entities) 
 
Civil sanctions 
(ammèndes 
civiles): 
EUR 5 million  
 
 
CROATIA X Only maximum threshold  Most serious 
infringements: 
up to 
EUR 662 556.
81 (legal 
persons); 
EUR 331 278.
41 (physical 
persons). 
Lower caps for 
serious and 
minor 
infringements 
 
ITALY X Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 2 000 
(EUR 500 
for 
payment 
delay) 
EUR 50 000 
(EUR 500 000 
for payment 
delay) 
 
CYPRUS X Only maximum threshold   Up to 10% 
LATVIA X Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 70   Up to 
0.2% of 
net t.o. 
LITHUANIA X Only maximum threshold  EUR 120 000  
HUNGARY X Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 318 EUR 1 591 00
0 
Up to 10% 
AUSTRIA Infringement     
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MS Pecuniary 
sanctions 
Minimum/maximum/
no thresholds 
Minimum 
pecuniary 
sanctions 
Maximum 
pecuniary 
sanctions 
% 
turnover 
(t.o.) 
s of sections 
1-4, Local 
Supply Act, 
are 
addressed, 
resorting to 
only civil 
remedies 
(injunctions, 
damages) 
POLAND X 
(to the entity 
and to 
managers) 
   Up to 3% 
PORTUGAL X Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 250 
for natural 
persons 
EUR 500 
for micro-
enterprises 
EUR 750 
for small 
enterprises 
EUR 1 000 
for 
medium-
sized 
enterprises 
EUR 2 500 
for large 
enterprises 
EUR 20 000 
for natural 
persons 
EUR 50 000 
for micro-
enterprises 
EUR 150 000 
for small 
enterprises 
EUR 450 000 
for medium-
sized 
enterprises 
EUR 2.5 millio
n for large 
enterprises 
 
ROMANIA X 
(criminal 
sanctions 
imposed by 
Consumer 
Protection 
Authority) 
Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 10 75
6.15 
EUR 21 512.3
1 
 
 
SLOVENIA X Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 6 000 EUR 18 000  
SLOVAKIA X Minimum/maximum 
thresholds 
EUR 1 000 EUR 300 000  
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
X Only maximum threshold   1% of t.o. 
in UK 
 
As Table 11 suggests, the variations within fining rules are remarkable. Not only is there 
a difference between MSs that define only a maximum fine and those that also define a 
minimum, but the amounts also vary from EUR 18 000 (Slovenia) to EUR 2 500 000 
(Portugal). When the maximum fine level is high, variations occur within the national 
system and often the sanctioning criteria are not very detailed. Both within and between 
MSs, these variations may relate to the gravity of the infringements and the 
characteristics of the infringer. Different approaches concern the link between 
sanctioning and the status of the infringer. In most MSs, no direct and specific relevance 
seems to be attributed to the victim’s status (e.g. it does not matter, when establishing 
the amount of a fine, whether the victim is a medium, small or micro-enterprise). 
However, in some MSs, for the same UTP, the amount of a fine can be higher for a large 
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enterprise than for a medium or a small one56. Clearly, the status of an enterprise is 
relevant when the legislation applies to protect only micro-enterprises or it excludes 
cooperatives. The amount of the fine can vary depending on the number and size of the 
producers affected when the consequences of the UTP on the market are taken into 
account57. 
In some MSs, fines are related to the infringer’s turnover, normally as a reference for the 
maximum amount of fines (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, 
Poland, UK). In other MSs, fines are related to the benefits accrued from engaging in the 
UTPs (e.g. in Italy58). Some MSs (Croatia, France, Portugal) distinguish between natural 
and legal persons and define the maximum amount accordingly (higher for legal than for 
natural persons)59. More rarely, the maximum fine amount is explicitly linked to the 
magnitude of the consequences of the UTP and the impact on the fairness along the 
chain or the market. References are made to the effects of the practice on the market in 
relation to fairness and competitiveness, which allow the economic impact of the UTPs to 
be captured. In some cases, sanctioning is correlated to the gravity of the infringement, 
based on the distinction between minor, major or serious offences60. In some countries, 
the fine amount is determined not only by reference to the seriousness of the 
infringement but also to the conduct of the infringer after the infringement and its 
availability to voluntarily stop the unlawful conduct and remove the consequences61. The 
                                           
56 See Portuguese Decree-Law no 166/2013. 
57 See, for example, Article 25, Spanish law no 12/2013, on the scale of penalties, according to which penalties 
shall be scaled mainly on the basis of the degree of intentionality or the nature of the damage caused. 
58 See Italy: ‘art. 62. 6. Unless the fact constitutes a crime, the contract party, except for the end 
consumer, that breaches the duties established by par. 2, is punished by means of administrative fine from eur 
2.000,00 to eur 50.000,00. The amount of fine is determined having regard to the benefit obtained by the 
person that has breached the duties established by par. 2 (unofficial translation, emphasis added’. 
59 See Croatian Act on the prohibition of unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food supply chain, 
Official Gazette 117/17: ‘The cap amount of the fine for a most serious infringement may amount to up to 
HRK 5 million for a legal person and HRK 2.5 million for a natural person, where a legal or a natural person is a 
buyer and/or processor or re-seller within the meaning of the UTPs Act and sells the product under the price 
which is lower than any other purchase price in the product purchase chain, as referred to in Article 12 item 14 
of the UTPs Act.’ 
60 See, for example, Spanish Law 12/2013, of 2 August, measures to improve the functioning of the food supply 
chain (emphasis added). ‘Article 23. Infringements with regard to food procurement contracting. 1. The 
following are minor food procurement contracting infringements: a) Failure to draw up a written food 
procurement contract as specified in this Act. b) Failure to include at least the minimum required details in 
the food procurement contract. c) Failure to meet the conditions and requirements applicable to electronic 
auctions. d) Failure to keep obligatory documents on file. e) Introduce changes in the terms of the contract 
that were explicitly agreed by the parties. f) Require additional payments over the price agreed in the 
contract, except in the cases provided for in this law. g) Require or disclose sensitive commercial 
information from other operators obtained in the negotiation process or implementation of a food 
procurement contract, breach of confidentiality and the use of said information for purposes other than 
those expressly agreed in the contract. h) Failure to comply with the obligation to provide the information 
that is required by the competent authorities in the exercise of their duties. 2. The commission of two or 
more minor offences within two years as from the date of issue of the final administrative decision of the 
first one is considered a serious offence. Failure to comply with payment periods in commercial 
transactions involving food or food products is considered a serious offence in accordance with Law 
15/2010 of 5 July 2010, amending Law 3/2004 of 29 December 2004 establishing measures to combat late 
payment in commercial transactions. 3. The commission of two or more serious offences within two years 
as from the date of issue of the final administrative decision of the first one is considered a very serious 
offence.’ 
61 See under the Polish law (OJ 2017 Item 67 ACT of 15 December 2016 to prevent the fraudulent use of 
contractual advantage in trade in agricultural products and groceries): ‘In fixing the amount of the fines 
imposed in accordance with paragraph 1, paragraph 1, the President of the Office shall take into account 
attenuating or aggravating circumstances in the case. 
Examples of mitigating circumstances referred to in paragraph 2, are in particular: 
1) voluntary removal of effects of the infringement; 
2) failure by the supplier or buyer, on its own initiative, the practice of using the contractual advantage unfairly 
before proceedings are instituted or immediately after its initiation; 
3) on its own initiative to take action to stop the infringement or remedy the effects thereof; 
4) working together, the President of the Office in the course of proceedings, in particular to contribute to a 
rapid and smooth conduct of proceedings. 
Aggravating circumstances referred to in paragraph 2 shall be the intentional nature of the infringement and a 
previous similar infringement.’ 
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nature of the sanctions and the size of imposed fines can vary depending on whether or 
not the infringer is a repeat infringer (e.g. Greece, Spain).  
In the absence of a reliable study concerning fining practices, the anecdotal evidence 
suggests that strong variations occur between MSs. These variations are also correlated 
with different interpretations of the principle of proportionality that informs the exercise 
of sanctioning power by administrative authorities. This principle and its diverse 
application between MSs also relates to the relationship between penalties and corrective 
remedies when provided62. 
Sanctions’ effectiveness may be complemented by the publication of the administrative 
decision63. When legislation explicitly provides for it, a balance between the 
punitive/deterrent function of publication and procedural guarantees for the sanctioned 
party is ensured, for example by giving evidence on judicial review and revocation64.  
There is no clear evidence on the effectiveness of fines and financial penalties in the agri-
food sector. The complementarity approach suggests that these sanctions might be 
necessary but are not sufficient to deter offenders and to compensate victims. The 
reputational sanctions might have as significant a deterrent effect, especially when issued 
against retailers affected by consumers’ behaviour. This happens when they are public 
and reach a wide number of consumers. 
4.1.5 Administrative injunctions 
Together with fines, administrative enforcers can also issue injunctions that prohibit the 
unfair practice and order the removal of the consequences of the infringement. Injunctive 
powers are often explicitly conferred on administrative authorities (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Italy, Lithuania), sometimes only on courts (Cyprus) and sometimes on the 
basis of requests filed by administrative authorities or other eligible entities (Germany, 
France, Austria). Depending on national procedural laws, courts may order injunctive 
relief on the basis of general administrative rules. 
Injunctions may be prohibitive and/or affirmative, with orders to modify the current 
practices. Unfair practices involve transferring costs and risks along the supply chain. 
While unlawful cost transfer may be tackled by monetary transfers, the unfair distribution 
of risks may require more structural intervention in the organisation of the supply chain. 
This is the case for perishable goods where the issue related to disposal includes 
significant organisational changes both on the suppliers’ side and on the retailers’ side. 
                                           
62 See, for example, the UK’s Draft Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill (available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0062/en/cbillen_2012-
20130062_en_1_content.htm), Schedule 3: Order conferring power to impose financial penalties: 
79. The Government considers that financial penalties may not be necessary in order to secure a high level of 
compliance with the Groceries Code by large retailers.  
80. The Secretary of State would need to authorise financial penalties by order under clause 10, approved by 
each House of Parliament (see clause 24). 
81. Under paragraph 1 of Schedule 3, the Secretary of State could only make an order if, following consultation 
under paragraph 6, he or she thought the Adjudicator’s other powers (including recommendations and 
requirements to publish) were inadequate. The order would need to specify the maximum penalty that 
could be imposed or how to calculate the maximum: for example, by reference to the retailer’s groceries 
turnover or the value of relevant supply arrangements. The order could also require the Adjudicator to 
publish guidance about the criteria the Adjudicator intends to adopt in deciding the amount of a financial 
penalty. By delaying and leaving open the question of whether financial penalties are needed, clause 10 
and Schedule 3 allow the Secretary of State to take into account the history of enforcement of the 
Groceries Code by the Adjudicator, together with the views of those affected. 
63 See section 4.1.7 below and Table 12. 
64 See, for example, Article 6(8), Hungarian Law XCV 2009: ‘(8) The name (company name) and address 
(registered office) of the trader that assumed unfair distributor conduct, the infringement established, the 
amount of fine imposed and, if the resolution is revoked, this fact, the fact that the judicial review 
proceeding has commenced, the content of the final judgment, and the resolution that makes the 
undertaking as per section 8(1) obligatory shall be published by the agricultural administrative authority on 
its website and by the Minister responsible for agricultural policy in the Ministry’s official gazette and on its 
website. The data shall be removed from the website two years after the final establishment of the 
violation and they cannot be published again following this date.’ For more examples see section 4.1.7 
below and Table 12.  
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This is an issue that touches on the broader question related to waste disposal65. Cost 
and risk transfers can both be addressed by injunctions but with different content. 
Prohibition of clauses transferring costs have to be combined with astreintes and 
restitution if the injunction is not complied with. Risk transfer may force organisational 
changes in the supply chain. The injunction should not only prohibit the transfer but also 
force organisational changes that prevent such transfers in the future. 
The practice of enforcement suggests that, both at the investigation level and the 
sanctioning stage, the scope remains relatively limited and a thorough analysis of the 
effects along the supply chain by the enforcer is missing. Indeed, administrative 
authorities still focus on the impact of UTPs on single producers without engaging in an 
analysis of the effects along the chain. 
4.1.6 The boundaries between administrative and criminal sanctions and 
the principle of ne bis in idem 
For the most part, the MSs legislation has introduced administrative sanctions and 
conferred enforcement power on existing or, in some cases, new authorities. This leaves 
open the issue of the possible criminal nature of the administrative sanctions and the 
ensuing question about ne bis in idem, for example whether criminal sanctions can be 
combined with administrative sanctions. A prominent exception is Ireland, where UTPs 
are considered criminal offences and the sanctions are criminal. In the Irish case, the 
Competition and Consumer Authority can issue a decision with findings concerning the 
UTP but it has to refer the case to the criminal court that can order the criminal 
sanction66. The qualification of UTP as a criminal offence is featured in other MSs (e.g. 
Austria and Romania).  
In other MSs, serious infringements may also constitute criminal offences. Depending on 
the gravity of the UTP, it can be classed as criminal or administrative. MSs seem in this 
case to embrace various sanctions including administrative fines and convictions (e.g. 
Ireland). When the same offence can have both an administrative and a criminal facet, 
the administrative enforcer has to take into account the administrative sanction. In the 
case of a fine, the enforcer should discount the amount paid under the criminal 
proceeding from the total if that is higher. Otherwise, no administrative fine can be 
ordered. Whether ancillary administrative sanctions can be ordered in addition to criminal 
ones varies across MSs. 
4.1.7 Reputational sanctions via administrative enforcement 
It is generally believed that reputational sanctions associated with market consequences 
(such as blacklisting) are generally the domain of private regulation and enforcement by 
                                           
65 See European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2016 on unfair trading practices in the food supply chain 
(2015/2065(INI)). 
66 See Irish legislation: CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2007 (GROCERY GOODS UNDERTAKINGS) REGULATIONS 
2016 S.I. NO 35 OF 201 ‘This Regulation sets out the provisions of the overall Regulations that will be treated 
as penal provisions for enforcement purposes. Breach of the cited provisions (including failure to comply with 
any contravention notice issued by the CCPC under the Consumer Protection Act 2007) may result in 
prosecution, either by summary or indictment with potential penalties as follows:  
(1) A person guilty of an offence is liable on summary conviction to the following fines and penalties:  
(a) on a first summary conviction for any such offence, to a fine not exceeding €3,000 or imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 6 months or both;  
(b) on any subsequent summary conviction for the same offence to a fine not exceeding €5,000 or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both.  
(2) If, after being convicted of an offence, the person referred to in subsection (1) continues to contravene the 
requirement or prohibition to which the offence relates, the person is guilty of a further offence on each 
day that the contravention continues and for each such offence is liable on summary conviction to a fine 
not exceeding €500.  
(3) A person guilty of an offence is liable on conviction on indictment to the following fines and penalties:  
(a) on a first conviction on indictment for any such offence, to a fine not exceeding €60,000 or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 18 months or both;  
(b) on any subsequent conviction on indictment for the same offence to a fine not exceeding €100,000 or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 24 months or both. 
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private actors. However, administrative enforcers are considering the possibility of using 
reputational sanctions in addition to the more conventional array of measures. In 
particular, the reputational sanction may consist of the publication of the administrative 
decision. 
A similar reputational effect is attained through the publication of decisions by enforcing 
authorities, as illustrated in Table 12. 
Table 12. Publication of enforcement decisions of administrative authorities. Summary information 
(examples, not necessarily exhaustive) 
MS PUBLICATION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITY’S DECISIONS ON 
UTP ENFORCEMENT 
HIGHLIGHT IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITY’S ANNUAL 
REPORT OR ON ITS WEBSITE 
BULGARIA X  
CZECH REPUBLIC  X 
(de facto – no legislative 
reference available) 
SPAIN X  
FRANCE X  
CROATIA  X 
(de facto – no legislative 
reference available) 
ITALY X  
CYPRUS X  
LITHUANIA  X 
POLAND  X 
UNITED KINGDOM X  
4.1.8 The practices of administrative enforcement in Member States 
The practice of administrative enforcement depends on national administrative 
substantive and procedural laws that differ significantly67. As was shown in the previous 
tables, significant variations across MSs within administrative enforcement concern not 
only the number of investigations but also the outcome of the enforcement action (the 
type and intensity of sanctions). These divergences are partly determined by the 
legislative frameworks and are partly related to the approach taken by individual 
enforcers. Divergences in practices may occur even when legislation is similar.  
The European Commission reported a significant variation across MSs regarding the UTPs 
evaluated through the number of investigations. It stated: ‘The actual number of 
investigations into alleged unfair trading practices differs significantly across Member 
States. Around a third of Member States with public enforcement had no cases in the last 
few years (AT, BG, FI, HR, LV, RO, SI); another third just investigated a few cases (CY, 
DE, IE, LT, UK); and the remaining third dealt with dozens or even more (CZ, ES, FR, 
HU, IT, PT, SK). To some extent, this could be attributed to the different salience of the 
problem in the different Member States’68. 
More recent data suggest that no relevant changes have occurred since the EC report 
was published (see table below). Indeed, most of the MSs where the case rate is still low, 
or at zero, have adopted legislation very recently (e.g. Ireland, Croatia) or are still 
relying on existing legislation with limited scope (e.g. Austria, Finland) and some of them 
are considering the adoption of new more focused legislation (e.g. Finland).  
                                           
67 See European Parliament Resolution, A regulation for an open, efficient and independent European Union 
Administration, European Parliament Resolution of 9 June 2016 (2016/2610(RSP)). 
68 See European Commission Report (2016), p. 7. 
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Table 13. Enforcement practices during 2015-2016  
MS Number of 
complaints 
(2015-
2016) 
Number of 
complaints 
resulting 
in further 
action 
after 
complaints 
Investigation 
conducted by 
enforcement 
bodies 
(2015-2016) 
Results of 
investigation/proceedings 
BULGARIA 8 8 8 - 5 pending investigations 
- 2 infringement decisions 
(fines applied) 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
22 18 31 - 2 closed proceedings (no 
infringement found)  
- 2 closed proceedings 
(commitment accepted) 
- 0 fines 
GERMANY 10 Few cases 1 Annulled by the Higher 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf 
IRELAND 0 0 0 N/A 
GREECE N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SPAIN 98 98 1 784 - 43 sanctions proceedings 
based on confidential 
complaints  
- by December 2016, 347 
sanctions proceedings based 
on ex officio investigations 
- 95 fines applied 
FRANCE 595 
(2015); 
494 (2016) 
 2015: 36 
national, 25 
regional;  
2016: 32 
national, 20 
regional; 2016 
8 civil proceedings in 2015, 
6 in 2016; 
158 criminal sanctions 
applied in 2015; 
134 criminal sanctions 
applied in 2016 
CROATIA N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CYPRUS 0 0 0 N/A 
LATVIA 2 2 2 Pending 
LITHUANIA 0 0 1 Injunction and fine 
HUNGARY 41 41 152 -29 fined undertakings 
- 11 investigations ended 
(commitments accepted) 
- 67 ended (no infringement 
found) 
AUSTRIA 6 6 6 Fines 
POLAND 0 0 0 N/A 
PORTUGAL 80 (2015); 
46 (2016) 
26 (2015); 
20 (2016) 
2 (2015); 
2 (2016) 
- 42 impositions of sanctions 
- 33 without any sanctions 
ROMANIA 0 0 0 N/A 
SLOVENIA N/A N/A 0 N/A 
SLOVAKIA 9 9 39 -12 (infringement found; 4 
fines applied) 
- 18 (no infringement found) 
- 9 pending 
SWEDEN 0 0 0 N/A 
UK - 0 request 
for 
arbitration 
0 1 Pending 
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4.1.9 Conciliation and mediation by public bodies 
In addition to conventional administrative enforcement in its different facets, public 
bodies also engage in various forms of amicable dispute resolution (ADR). Private ADR 
mechanisms have long been used. Publicly managed dispute resolution systems are 
entering the scene and are likely to develop further. They represent a different facet of 
the cooperative approach. The promotion of amicable resolution between enterprises 
promoted by the administrative enforcers is more effective, since it operates in the shade 
of conventional enforcement: parties are asked to reach amicable solutions. If they do 
not achieve that result, the enforcer can shift into applying the more conventional array 
of instruments. 
This is a grey area for at least two important reasons. Firstly, institutionally, there are 
many instances where bodies in charge may have a hybrid identity and the enforcement 
body is composed of both public and private actors. Secondly, functionally it is a grey 
area because the evolution of administrative enforcement into forms of cooperative 
enforcement between enforcers and infringers makes the boundaries between 
enforcement and ADR blurrier. However, as the Bulgarian example shows, there is room 
for public bodies to engage in mediation and conciliation. The Bulgarian legislation has 
opted for a relatively formal approach: the Reconciliation Commission, sitting at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, can conclude its proceedings with a written binding agreement 
between the two or more litigants69. In other cases, in which the code is enforced 
through legislation (as is the case in the UK), retailers are under a duty to negotiate in 
order to solve the dispute ‘amicably’. If this attempt fails, an arbitration procedure is 
started70. 
4.1.10 Monitoring compliance by administrative bodies 
Monitoring compliance is part of the enforcement function in both administrative and 
private dispute resolution mechanisms. It is not generally part of judicial enforcement, 
where it is for the potentially injured parties to raise the issue of non-compliance. Within 
administrative enforcement, compliance monitoring includes pre- and post-infringement 
actions.  
4.1.10.1 Pre-infringement monitoring compliance  
Enforcers can ask potential infringers to adopt a compliance governance that enables 
them to detect and remove UTPs. The compliance can either refer exclusively to the large 
buyer (chain leader) or include the various segments of the supply chain71. 
                                           
69 See Bulgarian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC),, ‘Article 37k. (1) The reconciliation procedure shall be 
completed by concluding a written agreement between the parties. The agreement shall be drawn up by 
the commission within a 3-month time limit from instituting the reconciliation procedure and shall be 
provided to the parties to the dispute. (2) The parties to the dispute shall conclude the agreement within a 
10-day time limit of receiving it. (3) In case that within the time limit under Paragraph 1 the reconciliation 
commission has not provided a written agreement or the agreement is not accepted by the parties to the 
dispute, the procedure shall be terminated.’ 
70 UK, THE GROCERIES (SUPPLY CHAIN PRACTICES) MARKET INVESTIGATION ORDER 2009, Sec. 11. Dispute 
resolution scheme. 
71 See the UK’s GCA compliance tips: ‘Compliance tips. Retailers should take the following steps to ensure they 
comply with the Code, and mitigate the financial and reputational risks of non-compliance: 
1. Start at the top – all compliance efforts stand or fall based on whether they are supported (and, crucially, 
seen to be supported) by senior management. Regular and unequivocal reminders from senior 
management about both the terms of the Code, and the business’s commitment to compliance, are 
essential.  
2. Appoint a Code Compliance Officer – to raise awareness of the Code both internally and externally, and 
report to internal Compliance and Audit Committees. The GCA expects Code Compliance Officers to be 
proactive in identifying, pursuing and resolving potential Code issues across the business.  
3. Encourage and facilitate internal communication of Code issues – proper compliance requires engagement 
and a joined-up approach from all the business areas to which the Code is relevant (e.g. buyers, finance 
and marketing may all be affected by the rules against recharging design costs to suppliers). The GCA 
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4.1.10.2 Post-infringement monitoring compliance using scorecards 
Enforcers have to monitor compliance after the infringement. Post-infringement 
monitoring encompasses not only monitoring compliance with commitments, 
recommendations and sanctions but also the infringer’s own efforts to remove the 
primary causes of the infringement. Enforcers not only have to ensure that sanctions are 
complied with and that the infringement is terminated; they also have to make sure that 
the causes of the infringement, such as the transactional model along the chain, are 
removed and transactional practices are modified. Monitoring the behaviour of the 
infringers over time is important to verify compliance with the specific order (for example 
an injunction) and to evaluate improvements over time to ensure a fairer distribution of 
risks along the supply chain. The majority of enforcers do not have a stable system to 
monitor infringers’ conduct. The GCA in the UK adopts the continuous improvement 
approach and monitors the conduct of the infringers over time72.  
The continuous improvement approach is especially important when collaborative modes 
are adopted. Often changes requested by the enforcer after the infringement call for an 
adaptation of the supply chain. The sanctions and the remedies focus on the UTPs but 
the causes of the practice may lie in the organisational structure of the chain. Specific 
instruments, such as scorecards, are required to monitor the changes designed to 
prevent UTPs in the future. Scorecards with indicators measure improvements over time 
when the removal of infringement’s causes requires structural changes that are hard to 
implement instantly. Scorecards look at the behaviour and its impact on the entire chain. 
Monitoring compliance should look at improvements made by the chain leader in 
organising exchanges along the chain by involving first-, second- and third-tier suppliers 
together with multiple intermediaries. 
For example, addressing UTPs related to the payment system along a supply chain 
requires time. The payment system in long-term business relationships may require deep 
reorganisation. For example, payments often include some degree of input financing, 
some contribution to new technologies and/or premiums for sustainability achievements. 
These may be factored into the price or may be paid separately; they may be paid before 
or after performance. In the former case they provide resources and represent an 
investment. In the latter case they simply reward the performance and its quality. Modes 
                                                                                                                                   
found that Tesco’s buyer and finance teams were not co-ordinating on Code issues, so were not fully aware 
of what each other were doing.  
4. “Hardwire” the Code into supplier agreements – retailers should review their agreements, both standard Ts & 
Cs and bespoke supplier agreements, to ensure that they reflect the Code obligations (including by being 
clear and transparent) and that all the terms of each supplier’s agreement are captured in writing. Each 
supplier should have a copy of their agreement.  
5. Be clear and consistent with suppliers – if you do not already use standard wording on invoices and other 
communications concerning payments and charges, consider adopting that to ensure suppliers will always 
understand what they are being told.  
6. Review existing supplier payment processes – it is vital to ensure that payments to suppliers are not delayed 
unreasonably, whether deliberately or just due to systemic failures, inefficiencies or weaknesses.  
7. Avoid unilateral deductions from money owed to suppliers – give suppliers clear notice and explanations of 
proposed deductions, and a chance to dispute them before they are imposed.  
8. Consider an independent complaints procedure – ideally, this should be separate from the buyer who usually 
deals with the supplier. Tesco has created a Supplier Helpline with the aim of dealing with invoice queries 
and other supplier issues within 48 hours.  
9. Review performance against compliance goals – an effective compliance program needs regular reviews of 
the business’s performance against its key goals. Tesco committed to introduce regular audits throughout 
the year, and make bi-annual compliance declarations. It also committed to taking disciplinary action 
against employees responsible for breaching the Code, where necessary.  
10. Train staff – every good compliance programme requires regular, ongoing training of new and existing staff 
(particularly senior management, those dealing with suppliers and – as the Tesco case made clear – 
finance teams) to ensure familiarity with and understanding of their obligations. To be truly valuable, 
training must never be generic. It should be tailored to the circumstances of the retailer in question, and 
delivered to different internal audiences in ways that reflect their specific roles, responsibilities and 
practical experiences.’ 
72 See Grocery Code Adjudicator Annual Report and Accounts 2016/2017, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-code-adjudicator-annual-report-and-accounts-
2016-17. 
 40 
 
of payment and timing of payment have deep influences on the investment strategies of 
farmers, with repercussions along the entire supply chain.  
Measuring compliance in the medium term presupposes a set of targets and indicators 
that buyers and chain leaders have to put in place with the collaboration of all the actors 
along the chain. 
What are the elements that should be measured? What are tools to measure 
improvements? These are among the issues that deserve more in-depth analysis but are 
beyond the boundaries of the present study. 
4.2  Judicial enforcement 
Judicial enforcement complements administrative enforcement. It covers remedial areas 
that are not affected by administrative proceedings and it provides the potential injured 
party with a much more active role than they can play in administrative proceedings, 
where the relationship is between enforcer and infringer(s).  
Judicial enforcement may include criminal and civil UTPs. It may concern one or multiple 
infringers and one or multiple affected producers. When multiple infringers cooperate in 
deciding and operationalising the UTP, joint and several liability can be applied73. Many 
specific legislations define UTPs as civil or administrative infringement. However, some 
MSs (notably Ireland and, partly, Austria and Romania) emphasise the criminal aspects 
of UTPs and designate them as criminal offences. In other legal systems, the possibility 
to issue criminal sanctions in addition to administrative sanctions and civil remedies 
reflects the different facets of UTPs. Italy, for example, regulates UTPs and makes 
criminal offences an alternative to administrative infringements. The nature of the 
infringement results in an enforcement mechanism. If the infringement can be 
characterised at the same time as administrative, criminal and civil, then multiple 
enforcers can act. The multiplicity of enforcement systems reflects the importance of 
complementarity among the various pillars of the enforcement triangle. 
The new legislations mainly refer to administrative enforcement against UTPs. Those 
UTPs that are not specifically included in that legislation can still be tackled through 
general judicial enforcement when they represent a breach of contract or an act of unfair 
competition. That is to say, the MSs’ new legislation has not replaced the general clauses 
that were used before to address UTPs74. Judicial enforcement therefore applies to the 
new legislation for aspects concerning restitution and compensation which are not 
covered by administrative enforcement, and as a general form of enforcement for the 
UTPs not included in the new legislation.  
Judicial enforcement plays an important role in MSs that have not adopted a dedicated 
legislation on UTPs, as – for the most part – it represents the only means of protection 
for the injured parties in UTPs. In these cases, courts apply general contract or tort law 
and, when relevant, competition law. The lack of a dedicated enforcing authority and the 
costs and length of judicial proceedings may represent one of the drawbacks of not 
adopting dedicated legislation on UTPs. This conclusion may also apply to those MSs that 
have adopted only a limited set of provisions that mainly deal with pre-contractual 
misleading and aggressive commercial practices and rely only on judicial enforcement. 
This is the case in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, whose legislative approach, 
mainly drawn from consumer law, has been described above (see section 3). In these 
four MSs, the prohibition of unfair commercial practices is enforced by courts. In some 
cases, specialised courts (such as commercial or market courts) have jurisdiction (as is 
the case in Belgium, Finland and Sweden). Otherwise, general courts are competent. 
Courts have the power to impose injunctions (often reinforced through astreintes) and 
                                           
73 See, for example, § 13, Austrian Unfair Competition Act. 
74 See, for example, section 6(5), Hungarian Law (Act XCV 2009): ‘Notwithstanding any proceeding pursuant to 
this Act, the injured supplier may enforce its claim based on the distributor’s unfair conduct directly before 
court in a civil procedure.’ 
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fines. In some legislation, the right to damages and restitution is specifically recognised 
(Denmark). 
Access to judicial enforcement is primarily granted to those injured by UTPs. They can act 
individually or jointly when the same UTP has affected multiple producers or even 
multiple enterprises along the chain.  
Producers’ organisations may play different roles.  
(1) They may be granted an autonomous right to access courts. In some MSs, the 
law specifically defines the associations and public bodies entitled to bring a civil 
action before the court75. In the absence of specific legislation, general provisions 
of civil procedure apply to regulate standing and the possibility for producers’ 
organisations to seek remedies. In this case, they protect the collective interests 
of producers or more broadly of parties along the chain.  
(2) Alternatively, they may be granted a right to represent producers in the 
proceedings, filing a claim in their own interest.  
(3) Finally, there are MSs that do not allow producers’ associations to take part in 
the judicial proceeding. When they are not granted a right to be a party to the 
proceeding they may be enabled to intervene in the proceeding. Third party 
intervention warrants not a right to seek an independent remedy but simply a 
right to take part in the judicial proceedings and to present evidence on the 
existence of the practice and its harmful consequences.  
Table 14. Empowerment of enterprises’ associations in judicial enforcement of UTP legislation 
(examples) 
MS Power of enterprises’ associations in 
the enforcement of UTP legislation 
before courts 
(examples) 
FRANCE Power to start civil proceedings before the 
court 
AUSTRIA Power to file suits for cease and desist 
orders before the court 
 
Judicial enforcement is also open to administrative authorities and branches of 
executives76. In some MSs, such as in France, the Ministry of Economy is granted the 
possibility to seek remedy that would not be available to the injured parties. This is the 
case for amende civile (civil fine) and for repetition de l’indu (restitution of undue 
perfomance)77. Other MSs, such as Austria, grant several bodies the possibility to seek 
judicial remedies78.  
Judicial enforcement includes primarily compensation and restitution. To a limited extent, 
especially when unfair competition is applicable, judicial injunctions can also be issued. 
Judicial injunctions are granted in those systems that have extended the consumer 
                                           
75 See, for example, France L. 470-7 of code de commerce; Austrian Unfair Competition Act General provisions, 
Claim for an injunction: ‘§ 14. (1) In the cases referred to in Sections 1, 1a, 2, 2a, 3, 9c and 10, an 
injunction for cessation may be sought by any trader who offers goods or services of the same or related 
species or in the commercial market (competitor) or by associations promoting the economic interests of 
businesses, provided these associations represent interests that are affected by the action. In the cases 
referred to in Sections 1, 1a, 2, 2a and 9c, an injunction may also be claimed by the Federal Chamber for 
Workers and Employees, the Austrian Economic Chamber, the Conference of Chairs of the Austrian 
Chambers of Agriculture, the Austrian Trade Union Federation or the Federal Competition Authority. In 
cases of aggressive or misleading commercial practices under § 1 para. Point 2, paragraph 1 2 to 4, 
Section 1a or Section 2, an injunction may also be claimed by the Association for Consumer’. 
76
 See France Code de Commerce, Article 442/6.III. ; Austrian Unfair Competition Act, Article 14. 
77 See France, Article 442-6, Code de commerce. 
78 See section 14, Austrian Unfair Competition Act. 
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regulation implementing Directive 2005/29/EC79. Other MSs explicitly grant the judge the 
power to issue an injunction and other corrective measures (e.g. Germany, France, 
Cyprus)80. In some limited cases, judicial remedies also include civil penalties (amendes 
civiles)81. Moreover, in France the code de commerce imposes a renegotiation clause 
whose absence can be punished with an administrative penalty82. Publication of the 
judgment is allowed in some MSs. The party that suffered harm and/or producers’ 
associations can ask to publish the judgment at the expense of the infringer83. 
                                           
79 See, for example, section 14, Austrian Unfair Competition Act. 
80 See France Article 442-6, Code de commerce: ‘IV. - Le juge des référés peut ordonner, au besoin sous 
astreinte, la cessation des pratiques abusives ou toute autre mesure provisoire.’ 
81 See France Article 442-6, Code de commerce: ‘Ils peuvent également demander le prononcé d'une amende 
civile dont le montant ne peut être supérieur à cinq millions d'euros. Toutefois, cette amende peut être 
portée au triple du montant des sommes indûment versées ou, de manière proportionnée aux avantages 
tirés du manquement, à 5 % du chiffre d'affaires hors taxes réalisé en France par l'auteur des pratiques 
lors du dernier exercice clos depuis l'exercice précédant celui au cours duquel les pratiques mentionnées au 
présent article ont été mises en œuvre.’ 
82 See French Code de commerce ‘Article L441-8, Cour de Cassation, Com., 21 janvier 2014, pourvoi n° 12-
29.166, Bull. 2014, IV, n° 11. Art. 441-8, Modifié par Ordonnance n° 2017-303 du 9 mars 2017 - art. 2: 
Les contrats d'une durée d'exécution supérieure à trois mois portant sur la vente des produits figurant sur 
la liste prévue au deuxième alinéa de l'article L. 442-9, complétée, le cas échéant, par décret, dont les 
prix de production sont significativement affectés par des fluctuations des prix des matières premières 
agricoles et alimentaires comportent une clause relative aux modalités de renégociation du prix 
permettant de prendre en compte ces fluctuations à la hausse comme à la baisse. 
Cette clause, définie par les parties, précise les conditions de déclenchement de la renégociation et fait 
référence à un ou plusieurs indices publics des prix des produits agricoles ou alimentaires. Des accords 
interprofessionnels ainsi que l'observatoire de la formation des prix et des marges des produits 
alimentaires peuvent proposer, en tant que de besoin et pour les produits qu'ils visent, des indices publics 
qui peuvent être utilisés par les parties, ainsi que les modalités de leur utilisation permettant de 
caractériser le déclenchement de la renégociation. 
La renégociation de prix est conduite de bonne foi dans le respect du secret en matière industrielle et 
commerciale et du secret des affaires, ainsi que dans un délai, précisé dans le contrat, qui ne peut être 
supérieur à deux mois. Elle tend à une répartition équitable entre les parties de l'accroissement ou de la 
réduction des coûts de production résultant de ces fluctuations. Elle tient compte notamment de l'impact 
de ces fluctuations sur l'ensemble des acteurs de la chaîne d'approvisionnement. Un compte rendu de 
cette négociation est établi, selon des modalités définies par décret. 
Le fait de ne pas prévoir de clause de renégociation conforme aux deux premiers alinéas du présent 
article, de ne pas respecter le délai fixé au troisième alinéa, de ne pas établir le compte rendu 
prévu au même troisième alinéa ou de porter atteinte, au cours de la renégociation, aux secrets 
de fabrication ou au secret des affaires est passible d'une amende administrative dont le 
montant ne peut excéder 75 000 € pour une personne physique et 375 000 € pour une 
personne morale. L'amende est prononcée dans les conditions prévues à l'article L. 470-2. Le 
maximum de l'amende encourue est doublé en cas de réitération du manquement dans un délai 
de deux ans à compter de la date à laquelle la première décision de sanction est devenue 
définitive’ (emphasis added). 
83 See, for example, the French Code de commerce, Article 442/6: ‘La juridiction ordonne 
systématiquement la publication, la diffusion ou l'affichage de sa décision ou d'un extrait de 
celle-ci selon les modalités qu'elle précise. Elle peut également ordonner l'insertion de la décision ou 
de l'extrait de celle-ci dans le rapport établi sur les opérations de l'exercice par les gérants, le conseil 
d'administration ou le directoire de l'entreprise. Les frais sont supportés par la personne 
condamnée.’ (emphasis added). 
See, for example, the Austrian Unfair Competition Act: ‘25. (1) In the cases of §§ 4 and 10, publication of the 
sentence may be ordered at the expense of the sentenced party. (2) In the cases of §§ 4 and 10, the 
court may, upon application by the acquitted party, authorise such party to have the acquittal published at 
the expense of the plaintiff in the private prosecution within a specified period of time. (3) Where, except 
in the cases of §§ 11 and 12, a suit for a cease-and-desist order is undertaken, the court shall, upon 
application, authorise the prevailing party, if such has a legitimate interest in it, to have the sentence 
published at the opposing party's expense within a specified time limit. (4) The publication shall comprise 
the wording of the sentence. The manner of publication shall be defined in the sentence. (5) In civil 
proceeding[s], the court may, upon application by the prevailing party, define a text of the publication 
which varies from or supplements the scope or wording of the sentence. Such application shall be filed not 
later than four weeks after the sentence has become final. If such application is only filed after the end of 
the hearing, it shall be decided by the court of first instance by an order after the sentence has become 
final.’ 
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Table 15. Publication of enforcement decisions by courts. Summary information (examples, not 
necessary exhaustive) 
MS PUBLICATION OF COURT’S DECISIONS ON UTP 
ENFORCEMENT 
GERMANY X 
(for injunctions) 
FRANCE X 
HUNGARY X 
AUSTRIA X 
Judicial enforcement varies across MSs but is generally used less than administrative 
enforcement. In addition to the low level of litigation, there are noticeable variations 
concerning the legal basis to bring civil actions. In some MSs, the source is contract law; 
in others, tort or extracontractual liability; in others, unfair competition and restitution. 
Different causes of action may bring about differences in the availability of injunctive 
relief and the level of compensation. The new legislations seem to converge towards a 
‘contractualisation’ of UTPs but differences remain within and between legal systems 
about injunctions and civil penalties.  
Judicial enforcement includes litigation with multiple infringers. Multiplicity of infringers 
can materialise in at least two different ways: one where the infringers are all part of a 
supply chain (vertical multiplicity); the other where they are competitors but all engage 
in the same conduct against the same producers (horizontal multiplicity, as in a cartel). 
When the UTPs are committed by multiple infringers they can be severally and jointly 
liable for damages and be the joint addressees of an injunction ordering them to stop the 
practices and remove the harmful consequences. For example, in a supply chain the UTP 
may be the result of complicit behaviour of the retailer and the traders against the 
producers. Are the effects of the remedy relevant to all the infringers? Is there a 
difference generated by different levels of bargaining power?  
As to the injunction, the bargaining power distribution and the fault of each party plays 
no decisive role in defining the effects. All the infringers have to comply with the 
injunctions. Some differences may occur if the injunction has not only a prohibitive 
(negative) but also an affirmative facet. For example, if the injunction includes an order 
to modify the procurement policy within the chain, then targets may be differentiated 
according to their decision-making power along the supply chain.  
A more complicated case concerns damages when multiple infringers are involved. 
Several models can be deployed. It is often the case that damages can be awarded 
where the infringer is at fault or there has been an intention to cause harm. Joint and 
several liability can be granted if all the parties are at fault or some have committed an 
intentional tort and others a negligent tort. When the chain leader can be strictly liable 
for a UTP there can be joint and several liability of first- and second-tier suppliers based 
on fault, combining strict liability and negligence. But what if there is a considerable 
power imbalance in the supply chain  and the chain leader has imposed the UTP on the 
suppliers, which, as a result, have imposed it on the producers? Damages could be paid 
only by the chain leader if the practice towards producers has been imposed by the chain 
leader onto the processors that were ‘forced’ to apply the practice. The other participants 
in the chain have to show that they were forced to adopt the practice under the threat of 
contractual termination or similar threats. Only coercion might enable exemption from 
liability; otherwise, joint and several liability applies. When multiple infringers are at 
fault, differences in bargaining position may result in different degrees of culpability, 
which in turn may determine an uneven allocation of the burden to pay compensating 
damages. 
Proving the amount of damages – at least for some UTPs – is a significant difficulty, 
which explains the low level of judicial enforcement. While clearly UTPs shift costs along 
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the supply chain, it might not be easy to determine the amount of unlawful cost shifting 
for any practice. It is considerably easier to determine, for example, compensation for 
late payment, retroactive conditions, unilateral modifications of contracts and unlawful 
termination of the business relationship. 
The difficulties increase even further if the consequences of UTPs have to be evaluated at 
the chain level (multiple injured parties) rather than at the level of the specific bilateral 
relationship. At the chain level, the interdependent effects of UTPs may have a very wide 
reach and the distribution of costs may include several stages of the chain. 
Lack of a clear legislative framework (until the specific legislations were enacted), the 
lack of incentives to use the court system, the fear factor and the concern about 
disruptive consequences in the business relationship have all contributed to a limited use 
of adjudication as an enforcement mechanism. The weaknesses of judicial enforcement 
should not lead to the conclusion that it is useless. On the contrary, many consequences 
of UTPs can be tackled only through judicial enforcement. Judicial enforcement needs 
some reform that has not been addressed by the new legislation, which focuses mainly 
on administrative enforcement. 
Complementarity poses challenges to the modes of coordination between various 
enforcement systems. National legislations do not effectively address the issue of 
coordination among enforcement mechanisms and between different judicial disputes. An 
interesting exception to this is the Irish system, where it is expressly stated that findings 
of an infringement by a retailer constitute res judicata and can be used by different 
parties in subsequent litigation84. Here, the relationship is between criminal findings and 
a right of action for civil remedies. If the criminal offence has been ascertained, the civil 
action can be based on those findings. Hence, when the large retailer engages in 
criminally relevant behaviour, all those affected can bring civil actions asking for 
damages. In the Irish legal system, the civil action seems a ‘follow on’ from the criminal 
prosecution85. Coordination between judicial and administrative enforcement is needed 
both (1) when the UTP constitutes a criminal offence to regulate ne bis in idem 
consequences and (2) when a civil remedy may be sought to complement an 
administrative sanction to ensure consistency between the administrative decision and 
the judgment. 
4.3 Dispute resolution mechanisms 
The third pillar of the enforcement architecture is private dispute resolution. Enforcement 
systems exist at national level and have been adopted more recently at EU level. The 
model is collaborative and combines monitoring with informal enforcement. Formal 
enforcement is left to administrative authorities and to courts. 
The Food Supply Chain Initiative (FSCI or SCI) is a joint initiative developed by eight EU-
level associations that represent the food and drink industry (FoodDrinkEurope), branded 
goods manufacturers (AIM), the retail sector (the European Retail Round Table (ERRT), 
EuroCommerce, EuroCoop and Independent Retail Europe), the European Association of 
                                           
84 CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2007 (GROCERY GOODS UNDERTAKINGS) REGULATIONS 2016 S.I. NO 35 OF 
2016: ‘The Act also provides anyone who is aggrieved by the failure of a retailer or wholesaler to comply 
with any regulations or with any compliance notice issued under the relevant Section of the Act, shall have 
the right of action for relief against that retailer or wholesaler in the Circuit Court (any such relief, including 
exemplary damages, not being in excess of the limits of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in an action 
founded on tort).’ 
85 CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2007 (GROCERY GOODS UNDERTAKINGS) REGULATIONS 2016 S.I. NO 35 OF 
201. ‘Finally, the Act also provides that, where a Court has made a final finding in a particular case under 
these Regulations, that finding is res judicata for the purpose of subsequent proceedings whether or not 
the parties to those subsequent proceedings are the same as the parties to the first mentioned 
proceedings. Private litigant, relying on this legal doctrine, will not be required to prove the 
contravention of the relevant provisions afresh in a follow-on action in respect of the same 
contravention. Rather he or she will be able to rely on that earlier finding for the purpose of an 
action for damages.’ 
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Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME) and agricultural traders (CELCAA). 
The FSCI is managed by a governance group.  
‘The SCI, a voluntary framework for implementing the principles of good practice was 
launched in September 2013. Individual companies may join the SCI once they comply 
with the principles of good practice. Under the SCI, disputes between operators can be 
addressed through mediation or arbitration’86. 
The FSCI is organised in a multi-level structure with an EU platform and national 
platforms. The FSCI does not engage in adjudication. It monitors compliance with 
principles of the code of practice and, when violations are in place, tries to resolve them 
informally. The platform acts not ex officio but on the basis of complaints lodged by 
members. Only disputes among members can be brought before the governance group. 
‘The SCI focuses on organisational requirements at company level to prevent UTPs, 
including staff training and participation in dispute resolution mechanisms. Breaches of 
these organisational requirements can lead to the concerned company being excluded 
from the SCI. However, the SCI does not provide for any other type of sanction. 
Members of the SCI must ensure that the weaker parties using the dispute resolution 
mechanisms are not subject to commercial retaliation’87. 
Sanctions for non-compliance are membership-based and lack of compliance can lead to 
exclusion. No fining or injunctive power is conferred on the governance group. 
The regulatory approach is based on the identification of the unfair practices and the 
recommendation of best practices88. When, as it is the case in Italy, the code is 
incorporated into legislation, this becomes the regulatory approach in administrative 
enforcement. The FSCI distinguishes between minor and major breaches. The former do 
not result in any public statement while the latter do. 
It was shown that, in principle, administrative enforcement can be applicable both to a 
single infringement, involving one or multiple farmers and other players along the chain, 
and multiple infringements committed by different parties along the same chain or by 
several buyers. The most innovative contribution is the FSCI aggregated dispute regime. 
Aggregated disputes before the governance group concern infringements that affect 
multiple members and are committed by one or several members. They are dealt with by 
the EU governance group when infringers are located in different MSs or by national 
platforms when they all operate in the same MS. 
A variety of private enforcement mechanisms can be triggered, from internal dispute 
resolution (when the large enterprises have their own) to mediation and arbitration. 
                                           
86 See European Commission Report (2016), p. 8. 
87 See European Commission Report (2016), p. 8. 
88 See Supply Chain Initiative, Principles of Good Practice (2011). See specifically Recommendation for Good 
Practice in applying the SCI principles of fair dealing, information, confidentiality, and justifiable request, 
enacted at the end of 2017.  
 46 
 
5 Rethinking the policy options for UTPs in agri-food supply 
chains: an agenda for future research 
The analysis shows a significant amount of unfair practices along agri-food supply chains 
and an apparent growing disjunction between the economic evolution of supply chains 
and their legal regulation. We are confronted with both a regulatory and an enforcement 
gap. This is certainly true for UTPs but it probably applies to other issues concerning 
contracting along agri-food supply chains. 
The gap is caused more by legal fragmentation than by the absence of any legislative 
framework. Differences in the EU concern both the relevant UTPs, the legal techniques to 
prohibit or control the practices, the enforcement toolkit, the distinction between 
individual and mass infringements, and those between single and multiple infringers. 
Remarkable differences also exist in the scope of application of MSs legislation. These 
differences reflect alternative regulatory objectives and coverage; examples include 
whether general rules should regulate UTPs in all sectors or the agri-food supply chain 
requires specific rules; whether the same rules should apply in both domestic and trans-
border UTPs; whether they should cover the entire chain or only some segments; and 
whether they should apply equally along the chain or stronger protection should be 
granted to small producers at the upstream part of the chain.  
A sub-question about the scope of application is related to extraterritoriality, for example 
the desirability of extending legal protection to non-EU agricultural producers. Should EU 
and MS legislation tackle UTPs against non-EU producers? Should access to enforcement 
mechanisms be granted to producers from all over the world that sell products in the EU 
market? A global supply chain approach that features the EU as a global regulatory 
player should certainly move in this direction. EU law should control the global supply 
chains from every perspective, including risk and power allocation, and potential abuses. 
However, such a policy change could increase the costs of enforcement and translate into 
a less effective enforcement system for EU producers. There are therefore costs of 
adopting extraterritorial scope. One possible solution to ameliorate the cost of enforcing 
practices extraterritorially might be to differentiate the relevance of enforcement 
mechanisms and make extraterritorial enforcement available only for significant and 
widely spread infringements that include both EU and non-EU producers. This option 
would leave minor and individual infringements against non-EU producers out of the 
scope of EU intervention. 
Variations in legal protection represent a positive ground for experimentation; however, 
they also make it more difficult to tackle cross-border violations. Fragmentation makes 
enforcement difficult, especially in trans-border infringements that occur in the EU and 
within global supply chains. A decentralised enforcement mechanism does not provide 
effective solutions for UTPs that occur in global markets where agricultural commodities 
come from countries different from those where the food is processed or consumed.  
The four dimensions that need to be redefined in a legislative intervention 
concern the national versus European dimensions and the public versus private 
dimensions in both regulation and enforcement. It is clear that the solution is not 
about choosing between them but about their combination. How to combine MS and EU 
level approaches and how to combine public and private regimes are the most urgent 
policy questions related to a possible legislative intervention. 
The most urgent issues concern whether or not EU legislative intervention and impact 
would be useful to reduce and mitigate UTPs and, if so, what its determinant features 
should be. An EU intervention would be useful to guarantee a common ground in terms 
of principles related to forbidden UTPs and enforcement mechanisms, with identification 
of priorities over modes of infringement and sanctioning policies. It would be a useful 
opportunity to define coordination mechanisms among enforcers, which would be 
especially relevant in trans-border multi-party infringements. 
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An EU legislative intervention could provide principles that MSs’ legislation and private 
regulation have to follow. If it provides only minimum harmonisation, MSs are free to 
broaden the scope of intervention, the coverage of UTPs and the strictness of 
enforcement. A softer approach could be limited to principles, leaving details to MSs’ 
legislation. A harder approach could also include descriptions of (some) prohibited 
practices. In this case, the alternative would be between a list that exemplifies and a list 
that constitutes a mandatory floor to be expanded on by adding prohibited UTPs at MS 
level. 
Current variations in MSs’ legislation concern the combination and interaction between 
principles such as the duty to act in good faith and engage in fair dealing and specific 
forbidden practices. These distinctions result in different allocations of power between 
rule-makers and enforcers. Some legislations are more principle-based and the 
identification of practices is mainly left to the enforcers. Other legislations are more 
specific and the general principles have interpretative rather than creative functions. In 
the latter case, enforcers enjoy less discretion. Differences between MSs also occur in 
specific rules, as the late payment example shows (MSs have different thresholds of 
numbers of days to define what constitutes a late payment). Whereas different MSs’ 
legislative techniques may reflect alternative policy options, some limits to legal 
differentiation should be drawn within the boundaries of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
In other words, differentiation of legal instruments across MSs should not undermine the 
consistency of policy goals and results at EU level. 
Within the array of different legislative techniques, the choice between mandatory and 
default rules becomes very relevant. It is necessary to move away from a crude 
alternative between mandatory rules and freedom of contract, towards a wider set of 
options. In some areas, including default rules that parties can deviate from by using, for 
example, a ‘comply or explain’ technique would certainly increase the effectiveness of 
legislation. A good illustration of a combined use of mandatory and default rules is 
provided by the FSCI regulatory approach. Within the FSCI, prohibitive mandatory rules 
define unfair practices, and default rules recommend good practices. A more complex 
architecture could also include default rules in relation to UTPs prohibition. In this case, 
the prohibited practices may be differentiated between those regulated by mandatory 
rules and those regulated by default rules. Default rules may permit parties’ negotiations 
over contractual terms as long as certain procedures detailed in the contract are met, as 
exemplified in the above analysis (see section 3.2). Default rules may allow parties to 
reallocate the risks and costs as long as redistribution is made transparently and within 
the parameters of proportionality. Default rules permit taking into account chains’ 
specificities concerning the commodities, the level of industry concentration and the role 
of large distribution. The use of contractual clauses alternative to the legislative default 
should be carefully monitored to ensure that no abuses take place and that the default 
clearly represents the majoritarian best option. One possibility is the creation of a EU 
observatory of agri-food trade practices that collects information about contractual 
clauses deployed along the supply chains. This approach could be based on self-reporting 
by large retailers and buyers and should at least distinguish between horticulture, crops, 
aquaculture and livestock. 
On the substantive side, a clearer regime of private international law to regulate 
applicable law in trans-border infringements involving both multiple infringers and 
multiple injured parties is needed. A second, related, dimension concerns individual 
versus multi-party infringements and, in the latter case, the different regimes concerning 
multi-party infringers when they operate in different MSs. It is highly recommended that 
a few general rules about multi-party trans-border infringements to be implemented 
by MSs at national level are introduced. 
Enforcement includes public and private regimes with a remarkable variety of 
instruments and practices.  
There is clearly an enforcement gap in tackling UTPs. The gap stems from ineffective 
coordination within and between MSs. This enforcement gap increases even more in 
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relation to trans-border infringements. As to the enforcement framework, decentralised 
enforcement, both administrative and judicial, should be complemented by stronger 
coordination mechanisms among MSs. The new EU legislation should provide 
coordination instruments among administrative enforcers similar to those deployed in 
competition law under Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
or those just introduced in consumer law by Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004. An EU legal intervention could define one or more 
options for coordination in cases of cross-border infringements involving several MSs. 
Coordination should encompass investigations, sharing information and evidence, 
sanctioning practices, and remedies, especially when multiple infringers and multiple 
injured parties are located in various MSs. 
Sanctioning practices differ across administrative enforcers. This makes inconsistencies 
between MSs likely to occur. The same infringements in two or more MSs may be subject 
to different sanctions, or within the same ‘sanction family’ (financial penalties) 
significantly different amounts can be determined. Some legislations introduce 
differences between UTPs with major and minor infringements. Others do not 
differentiate between infringements having regard to their seriousness. The principles of 
effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness should be applied consistently by 
enforcers in all countries. Even if the sanctioning power is left to national enforcers, 
coordination may help to avoid inconsistencies and ensure a uniform deterrent effect.  
A second issue about enforcement is the coordination between administrative and judicial 
enforcement. Unlike competition law, where sequentiality has become the rule with 
Directive 2014/104/EU, with a few exceptions no coordination mechanisms have been 
introduced either at EU or at national level. In most jurisdictions, claimants may lodge 
complaints before an administrative enforcer and before courts simultaneously or 
sequentially. If no coordination is in place, administrative enforcers can start ex officio 
investigations even if a judicial dispute is in place. No consistency between the outcomes 
of parallel proceedings concerning the same UTP would be ensured. The same practice 
could be considered a UTP for the purpose of damages and not for that of administrative 
sanctions, leaving aside instances of criminal offences. The problem becomes even more 
significant when administrative and judicial enforcers belong to different MSs. Given the 
interaction between administrative and judicial enforcement, closer coordination between 
national administrative bodies and courts would also be highly desirable. A EU legislative 
intervention should at least clarify what the alternative options are, leaving MSs to 
choose based on the principle of procedural autonomy.  
The other relevant macro-question is whether or not the current complementarity 
between public and private regimes delivers the best results. If not, what are the 
changes that can make complementarity work better? The two dimensions concern 
substantive and remedial rules.  
As to the substantive rules, reinforcing the promotional role of private regulation may 
have positive effects if it is better coordinated with legislation. As previously described, 
there are very different approaches: some integrate private regulation and the code of 
practice in legislation; others keep a strong and stark separation between legislation and 
private regulation. To incorporate different admissible regulatory options into an EU rule 
may permit limited and consistent regulatory alternatives. The flexibility of private 
regulation can permit faster and more effective adaptation to the changing world of agri-
food supply chains. Monitoring by private regulators can provide rule-makers and 
enforcers with up-to-date information about the evolution of practices along global supply 
chains. UTPs are not stable over time, and new practices develop as markets change 
structure to reflect different production technologies and different consumer preferences. 
On the remedial side, the current national enforcement regimes are not very effective. A 
reform should include the possibility of private sanctions based on market mechanisms. 
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The reputational lever can be used more widely both in private regimes and in public 
enforcement systems. Reports made publicly available on the existence of UTPs and the 
applied sanctions may dissuade the infringer much more than any administrative 
sanction or injunction. This is even truer for repeat violations. Private regulation is the 
ideal environment to further develop the use of scorecards to measure improvements 
over time. Often, enforcement focuses on the consequences of UTPs and does not 
address the causes. Private regulation and forms of cooperative enforcement in the 
administrative domain may shift the focus and try to address the causes together with 
the consequences of infringements. Removing the causes of unfair practices may require 
significant adaptations of supply chain governance, which will take time. For this reason, 
the use of scorecards with appropriate indicators and targets may contribute to a more 
effective market regulation and to a better institutional environment for fair and 
sustainable agricultural growth.  
What are the possible effects of EU legislation regarding UTPs on the MSs’ current legal 
frameworks? An EU legislative intervention would not replace MSs’ current legislation. It 
would either fill in the gaps or complement the existing legislation. The use of general 
civil law and competition law should be considered inadequate to meet the 
implementation requirements of an EU legislative instrument. These MSs will be obliged 
to approve new rules on both the substantive and the remedial side. The impact on MSs 
with existing UTPs legislation would differ. Possibly the most significant impact would be 
more effective coordination of the enforcement bodies and increasing the influence of 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgments if preliminary references about 
UTPs were submitted. It would be the beginning of the process of soft harmonisation with 
both an impact on intra-EU trade in agricultural products and an impact on trade 
between non-EU countries and the EU, affecting both the structure of global supply 
chains and the exercise of unequal bargaining power.  
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